

# CURRENT *History*

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE  
OF WORLD AFFAIRS

FEBRUARY 1967

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FOR READING TODAY...FOR REFERENCE TOMORROW

# CURRENT *History*

FOUNDED IN 1914 BY  
*The New York Times*

PUBLISHED BY  
*Current History, Inc.*

EDITOR, 1943-1955:  
*D. G. Redmond*

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FEBRUARY, 1967  
VOLUME 52      NUMBER 306

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Published monthly by Current History, Inc., Publication Office, 1882 Ludlow St., Phila., Pa. 19103. Editorial Office: 12 Old Boston Road, Wilton, Conn. 06897. Second Class Postage paid at Phila., Pa., and additional mailing offices. Indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Individual copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright, © 1967, by Current History, Inc.

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# CURRENT History

FEBRUARY, 1967

VOL. 52, NO. 306

*In this issue, seven specialists explore the changing power balance in the Middle East and the strengths and weaknesses of the major nations of the area. Discussing the region's strategic and diplomatic value, our introductory article points out that because of its own domestic problems, in the 1960's, "Britain saw no escape from the necessity of withdrawing completely from the area east of Suez unless the United States was prepared to underwrite most of the cost of new installations and provisions for their defense."*

## Changing of the Guard in the Middle East

By HALFORD L. HOSKINS

*Professor of Middle East Studies, School of International Service,  
The American University*

THE CONTINUING NEED to maintain security on the basis of Western influence in the Middle East is only the contemporary version of an old problem. This derives from the fact that no segment of the earth's surface is of greater significance in international affairs than that which binds together the continents of Europe, Asia and Africa, bringing into juxtaposition not only people of the eastern hemisphere but also—in this age of technology—those of the western hemisphere as well. The diversity of interests thus brought into proximity inevitably has resulted in forms of competition disturbing both to the inhabitants of the area and to the peace of the world at large.

Within recent modern times the most persistent theme arising from this competition has been strife in its various forms, an inevitable result of the intersection within the area of the southward thrust of Russia with the easterly course of British, French and—

latterly—United States interests. Developments occurring meanwhile within the area itself have had no little bearing on the character of this great power contest. Especially noteworthy in this connection have been the rise of nationalism among the successor states of the Ottoman Empire, the finding of a large portion of the earth's petroleum within the area, and the intrusion of a Zionist state—Israel—into the very midst of the group of predominantly Arab and Muslim countries. These circumstances, together with the rapid evolution of means of communication and conveyance, provide a general background for an appreciation of the security problem in the Middle East.

Great Britain's successful effort in checking Russia's southward drive in the nineteenth century—sometimes with the aid of France—is a familiar story. That this drive was resumed in the present century, after an interval of internal revolution and foreign war, needs

no better illustration than the content of the memorandum presented by Soviet Foreign Secretary Vyacheslav Molotov to German Ambassador Count von Schulenberg on November 25, 1940, demanding "recognition of Soviet aspirations in the direction of the Persian Gulf." No essential change in Soviet territorial objectives took place prior to the close of World War II. Then, with Western Europe in a state of partial paralysis, the United States (as a feature of its effort for the recovery of Europe) assumed a measure of responsibility for the support of Greece and Turkey, which were hard-pressed by communist elements. There were implications in Point Four of President Harry Truman's inaugural address of January 20, and in his message to the Congress on June 24, 1947, of which the author himself may not have been fully aware; for his advocacy of extending technical and economic aid to underdeveloped countries in the Middle East assumed a prerequisite: that of political security in the area.

By way of contributing to the cause of security for the Western world in general, the United States took a leading part in setting up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. Even so early, this had some reference to the Middle East. It was certainly of more than passing significance that before the Iranian Shah terminated his visit to the United States on December 30, 1949, he had been assured not only of aid in other forms but also of "certain military assistance" in the interest of Iranian security. NATO itself was extended eastward as far as the Transcaucasian area by the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the alliance in the autumn of 1951. The issuing of the tripartite declaration by Britain, France and the United States on May 25, 1950, and the conclusion of the Baghdad Pact in 1955, after numerous misadventures, with the aid if not the formal membership of the United States, extended the so-called containment barrier into South Central Asia and theoretically insulated the Middle East from any overt aggression that otherwise might have been mounted from the Soviet bloc.


Shortcomings in early postwar plans for the defense of the Middle East from communist penetration were soon manifest. Difficulties stemmed from two fundamental sources. In the first place, the Soviet Union found covert ways of extending its influence into an area where the leading Western powers—Britain and the United States—could not avoid responsibility for the presence of Israel and the consequent displacement of nearly a million Palestinian Arabs. Quite aside from the Israel issue, the rapid growth of Arab nationalist sentiment after World War II conflicted with Western efforts to set up an effective defense structure in the area. In this regard, Egypt—through whose territory ran the Suez Canal—with a population roughly equal in size to the combined populations of the other Arab states in western Asia, functioned as bellwether. Its arms deal with the Soviet Union in 1955 practically unbolted the Western alliance structure in the Mediterranean and completed the ruin of containment as a defense formula. In paving the way for the Suez crisis of the following year it precipitated a vigorous arms race between the Arab states and Israel, and added immeasurably to the peace-keeping tasks of the Western powers as guided by Great Britain.

### THE SUEZ CRISIS

Other than the creation of Israel, probably no occurrence in recent times has more widely affected the Middle East environment than the seizure of Suez Canal operations by President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt on July 26, 1956. The resulting military attack on Egypt by Britain and France, in collusion with Israel, after the demonstrated ineffectiveness of American plans for the international operation of the Canal, failed through ineptitude and United Nations interposition. The attack did bring to an end, however, such influence as Britain and France still retained in the Arab world. It remained for the United States to take over such defense responsibilities in the Middle East as were still retained by Britain and France. The United States was better equipped to do this because of the



# THE MIDDLE EAST: A BROAD VIEW



—Map by Russell Lenz. Reprinted by permission from *The Christian Science Monitor*.  
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presence in the Mediterranean since the close of World War II of its Sixth Fleet—a general purpose task force. At the time of the Suez imbroglio, this force consisted of not less than sixteen destroyers, two aircraft carriers and three heavy cruisers plus certain logistical vessels. From this force at intervals, two destroyers and a seaplane tender were detached and despatched in rotation through the Suez Canal for routine service in the Persian Gulf. The fleet had no home port in the Mediterranean, remaining mainly at sea with occasional port visits by a few vessels at Rota, Villefranche, Naples, Malta, Piraeus, Izmir, or Cyprus. From time to time, as political conditions appeared to warrant, this force was augmented temporarily as, for example, after the issuance of the Eisenhower Doctrine in January, 1957, and prior to landings in Lebanon in 1958.

### FILLING THE VACUUM

Great Britain did not recover its primacy of influence east of the Mediterranean after the Suez episode. Before and for some years after World War II, Britain possessed a veritable chain of air, ground and naval bases throughout the Mediterranean, a chain supplemented by French positions and, for a brief period, by those of the United States. At one time or another after World War II, the three powers possessed or held treaty rights at as many as 43 bases approachable from the Mediterranean. For various reasons, outgrowths generally of nationalist influences, nearly all these positions were withdrawn from Western use within eight years after the close of World War II. Quite aside from this trend, which saw both Malta and Cyprus emerge as independent states and Gibraltar exposed to contest by Spain, Britain failed, for economic reasons, to recover its dominant position in the Mediterranean. In late years, except for vast technological improvements relating to the propulsion of surface and sub-sea vessels, the range and armament of missiles, the range and effectiveness of planes from aircraft carriers, and logistical arrangements enabling vessels to remain at sea indefinitely without recourse to fixed bases, the

Middle East might have luxuriated in a political vacuum practically immune from great-power interference. Neither Britain nor France could muster the financial resources necessary for remaining at the top level of efficiency in armament and only the United States, among the Western powers, possessed the wealth and facilities requisite for the maintenance of power—minus bases—in the Western approaches to the Middle East. In view of the recent buildup of Soviet naval strength in the Mediterranean, it remains to be seen whether the United States, with the newer forms of equipment, has adequately filled the vacuum left by the diminishing of British and French power in the area.

The maintenance of Western influence in the Middle East has by no means depended on the strength and visibility of military equipment alone. As the postwar concept of defense through containment gave place to deterrence laced with international competition, the uses of various types of aid as an adjunct to diplomacy were seen to be not only desirable but mandatory. In this respect, after World War II the United States possessed a capability well above the combined resources of its European allies. The Soviet bloc was also unable to compete on even terms in monetary outlay. By the year 1965, the total value of United States aid of various kinds extended to countries of the Middle East (including Egypt) since World War II amounted conservatively to not less than \$8 billion. It is difficult to assess the effects of this outlay, apart from other influences. Both Israel and Jordan were enabled to survive as individual states. At the same time, there was a growing cordiality in the relations of Turkey and Iran with the Soviet Union despite the application in these countries of United States aid valued at \$4 billion and \$1.5 billion respectively. Clearly, the influences that have been flowing into the Middle East in late years have not all been Western.

If the confrontation of rival power systems on the Mediterranean exposure of the Middle East might occasion some apprehension in Western capitals, the situation east of Suez surely has been no more reassuring. When

Britain and the four Middle Eastern members of the Baghdad Pact\* (later CENTO)—along with United States observers—were completing their defense organization late in 1955, they did not seem to anticipate that measures would also have to be taken to guard approaches to the Middle East from the Arabian Sea. Danger did not then appear to lurk in that quarter. While difficulties of various kinds abounded in Aden, Britain had given no serious thought to the abandonment of that strategic post. Indeed, plans were being laid for the construction there of one of the largest oil refineries east of Suez. At that period, Britain still maintained sovereign authority at points on the east African coast and Egyptian interference with Suez Canal operations had not yet become very disturbing. In postwar years, Britain had become dependent on Persian Gulf oil for the greater part of its energy requirements. Principally for this reason, a small post had been established on the island of Bahrain, whence surveillance could be extended over much of the gulf area.

### **BRITAIN IN THE PERSIAN GULF**

In 1961, British responsibilities in the gulf were put to the test. Shortly after a new British-Kuwaiti accord had been announced, attesting to Kuwait's independence and redefining Britain's protective role, Premier Abdul Karim Kassem of Iraq seized the opportunity to publicize a claim that Kuwait remained an integral part of the Iraqi province of Basrah, declaring that "the era of sheikdoms is over." His obvious objective drew immediate response from several sources, each with its own type of concern. Egypt's Nasser, aware of Kuwait's application for membership in the Arab League, expectant of largesse from Kuwait's ample resources, and suspicious of Kassem's designs in the Persian Gulf, gave voice in opposition before relapsing into sulky silence, presumably because

of great-power pressure which could not be disregarded. Saudi Arabia, which could adduce its own historic claim to Kuwait, gave assurance of its support of the sheikdom's independence. Iran dismissed the Iraqi claim as ludicrous. The United States advised the Iraqi government to avoid the use of force in pressing its claim.

Britain reacted the more calmly, because of its interest in the Iraq Petroleum Company whose relations with the Iraqi regime had seemed to be improving. Britain was not slow, nevertheless, in manifesting readiness to defend the sheikdom. While Kuwait mobilized its own miniscule forces, British troops, tanks and jet planes were landed at Kuwait at the sheik's request and other forces in Kenya, Aden and Bahrain were placed on alert. At the United Nations Security Council it became apparent that Iraq was receiving encouragement from the Soviet Union. Soviet insistence that the upbuilding of British forces in Kuwait and the assembling of naval units had created a "crisis" threatened to make a major international issue of what had begun as little more than an unpleasant regional incident.

The replacement of British forces in Kuwait with units from several of the Arab states, with Britain obviously less than anxious to continue in its former role as keeper of the peace, brought into open view the limits of Western-engineered pacts for Middle East security. That a Western power structure was needed east of Suez was made apparent not so much by the loss of positions of strength in the Mediterranean as by the easterly trend of Egyptian designs under Soviet sponsorship, Iraqi-Iranian clashes over navigation rights in the Shaat-al-Arab, increasing restiveness in Iran, and growing assertiveness of oil-wealthy Persian Gulf sheikdoms. Moreover, since the reopening of the Suez Canal in 1957, ready access from the West to South Arabia and the Persian Gulf was no longer assured. It is true that Egypt had not impeded passage through the canal of British armed vessels and personnel despatched for the defense of Kuwait in 1961. But, in view of other restrictions placed on the use of the canal when Egyptian

\* *Editors' note:* The Baghdad Pact, signed in 1955 by the United Kingdom, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey, became known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) after the withdrawal of Iraq in 1959.

interests might be involved, persistent reports that the Soviet Union was seeking from Egypt a concession for one or more naval stations in the Red Sea, the steady growth of the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean with increasingly sophisticated units, and reported Soviet influence in the armed forces of Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Algeria and possibly even Cyprus, there could be no certainty that the Suez Canal would be available for use on other and perhaps graver occasions.

Whereas partial answers to Middle East security problems in the westerly sectors of the Euro-Asian political complex had been sought in broad group alignments such as the Baghdad Pact (CENTO), security on Western terms in the environs of the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean proved to be peculiarly the concern of Great Britain and the United States. As long as Britain maintained control of the single practicable route between West and East with a long line of service stations extending from Gibraltar through the Mediterranean and from Egypt to the Persian Gulf, India and even Singapore, security along this tremendous line could be taken largely for granted. Yet almost within a decade this manifestation of former power all but vanished—breached not in one but in a number of places. Much of its significance disappeared with India's attainment of independence in 1947. Thenceforth, the line crumbled on both extensions served by the Suez Canal. The political utility of the stronghold of Aden had declined along with other way stations. With improvements in maritime transportation it was no longer the refueling and refitting station that it had been for upwards of a century. Subversive activities of Arab elements, both native and foreign, had so far undermined British administrative and commercial activities that not long after the reopening of the Suez Canal British authorities concluded that the strategic value of the station no longer justified a reported annual maintenance cost of some £168 million and that by 1968 it might well be phased out.

Within the Persian Gulf itself, British authority had been relaxing even before the

events of 1961 disclosed the futility of defending at enormous cost a petty state that no longer was inclined to look to Britain for guidance and was at least half inclined to regard with wary favor Egyptian aims in the gulf area. As to the matter of Persian Gulf petroleum, which for several years had constituted about 60 per cent of British oil imports, the British government was progressively disposed after 1960 to console itself with the thought that with world oil in oversupply it was, after all, a buyer's market. If oil should fail to arrive in quantity from the Persian Gulf—which was increasingly unlikely as huge supertankers came into service via the Cape of Good Hope—oil still could be secured from Nigeria or other parts of Africa. It seemed worthwhile still to retain a "presence" at the island of Bahrain supplemented by an air base at Sharjah, on the Trucial Coast, but in February, 1965, the *Economist* (London) suggested that—as in Aden—the British presence in the Persian Gulf was likely to be short-lived.

There is no reason to believe that the Labour government, more than any other political regime in Great Britain, has sought reasons with which to justify a policy of retrenchment in the Indian Ocean area. British Prime Minister Harold Wilson has been characterized as intent on the maintenance of positions east of Suez from which Britain can continue to maintain a role—not merely a presence—along the former imperial line to the east. The principal factor circumscribing such policy is that which has placed limits in late years on the British role in the Mediterranean: the lack of economic potential. Almost from the time when full control of Suez Canal operations passed into President Nasser's hands and an already visible political vacuum east of Suez began to assume serious dimensions, it was realized in Western halls of state that, if anything consequential were to be undertaken to fill this relatively empty power space, only the United States—already deeply concerned with security in the Middle East—possessed the physical and financial resources required for meaningful action.

Britain, nevertheless, took some initiative,



at least to the extent of serving notice that it felt continuing responsibilities in the area. Shortly after the Egyptian takeover of Suez Canal operations in 1956, it considered the practicability of setting up a new naval base at Mahé in the Seychelles island group. Early in 1957, it was announced in London that a military airfield would be reestablished at Gan in the Maldives. A few months later still, announcement was made of British plans to build a military base for air, land and sea services in Kenya as part of a revamped global strategy scheme. It was then contemplated that the British Middle East Command, once located in the Suez Canal Zone, later in Cyprus, might be moved to this African base. This appeared to be the more practicable because of reports that Soviet submarines had been supplied to Egypt, not only making the eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea unsafe but also further neutralizing the value of Aden. Plans based on these premises envisaged a series of Indian Ocean stations leading either to the Persian Gulf or eastward to Singapore.

By 1964, it was apparent that these plans could not be realized without United States aid. Already deeply involved in Vietnam and anxious to inhibit any communist power penetration in lands bordering on the Indian Ocean, the United States was ready to cooperate wholeheartedly in furthering British plans. There was full agreement on the acquisition of island sites. Accessible by way of the Cape of Good Hope, such sites would not be dependent on the Suez Canal. These positions would not invite attack from communist powers, yet they would not be so distant from the Asian mainland that countries bordering on the Arabian Sea or the Persian Gulf would fail to receive radiations of power.

In order to bring exploratory work to the point of decision, a combined American-British group of trained men began a systematic survey of island groups in the Indian Ocean in the autumn of 1964. Their report in May, 1965, recommended the choice of Diego Garcia, a Mauritius dependency in the Chagos Archipelago, perhaps a thousand miles south of the Omani coast, as the princi-

pal position, to be flanked in the western sector by the Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches islands. In November, 1965, Britain set up a new territorial designation incorporating the islands—the British Indian Ocean Territory—and plans were readied for construction of the facilities required, it being assumed that British operations would be confined largely to East Africa, South Arabia and the Persian Gulf.

Other problems had been developing meanwhile. As the United States was compelled to assume considerable burdens for Middle East defense in the Mediterranean area, largely for economic reasons, so also it was obliged to assume economic commitments well beyond the initial expectation in the Indian Ocean. With British manpower in short supply, foreign exchange overstrained and devaluation of the pound sterling a distinct possibility, Britain saw no escape from the necessity of withdrawing completely from the area east of Suez unless the United States was prepared to underwrite most of the cost of new installations and provisions for their defense. The British view was taken with more reluctance because of the manifest truth in the adage that "he who pays the piper calls the tune."

These developments placed the United States in something of a quandary. The newly-surveyed route of passage obviously was essential if ever the power vacuum adjoining the underbelly of the Middle East were to be filled, and a safe line of transit to the farther east established. Yet a steady rise in the cost of war in Vietnam, far beyond defense commitments in the Middle East and

(Continued on page 114)

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*By 1955, "Soviet Russia . . . entered the heartland of the Middle East practically by invitation." However, according to this specialist, "In their dealings in the Middle East both the West and the U.S.S.R." have failed.*

# The Soviet Union in the Middle East

By BENJAMIN SHWADRAN  
*Editor, Middle Eastern Affairs*

SOVIET RUSSIA'S INTERESTS and objectives in the Middle East may be divided into three categories: geographic and strategic determinants; ideological revolutionary expansion; and realistic Soviet adjustments to given conditions. The first—that of geography, strategy and military security—has been a factor in Russia's aims for the last 150 years. The two Middle Eastern countries contiguous with Russia, Turkey and Iran, have long blocked Russian influence and expansion southward.

Since the Russian revolution and after World War I, these two countries, together with the Western powers serving as League of Nations mandatories in territories of the former Ottoman empire, not only prevented Soviet expansion but endangered Russian security. If Russia were able to break through in Turkey and Iran, its influence and domination would spread throughout the Middle East, an area strategically important not only to Russia, but to the Western powers, especially because of the vast oil resources of the region.

To these basic considerations, which remained as important under the Soviet as under the Tsarist regime, after the revolution a new factor was added: the area could become a part of the world revolutionary movement—an extension of communism into the Near and Middle East and from there to the Far East. Despite this, practically up to the death of Stalin, the Soviet leadership was

either disinterested or saw no possibility of working with the opposition elements in the Middle East. Here and there, now and then, voices were heard advocating utilization of the Pan-Islam, Pan-Arab, anticolonial, and nationalist movements against the mandatory powers; but they remained no more than voices. All opposition movements were suspect and the local communist parties, legitimate and illegitimate, were small and insignificant; they could not be considered as forces for practical revolutionary operations. But perhaps the most decisive determinant was Russia's preoccupation with Europe; as a result, no significant importance was assigned to the East.

The radical change came in the mid-1950's when the national liberation movement in the Middle East was recognized as a potential instrument with which the Soviet Union could cooperate and which it could subsequently exploit. Ideological hesitations were somehow silenced. A basic preliminary objective of Soviet Russia—the weakening and removal of the Western powers from the area—coincided with the major objective of the national liberation movement in the Middle East itself and reaching this objective promised to be an almost painless operation. Without going into detail, it should be noted that world events and the policies or lack of policies of the Western powers in the area greatly facilitated the intrusion of the Soviets into the Middle East.

After the termination of World War II, the Soviet Union tried to attain its old objective in Turkey and Iran by force or pressure. However, the attempt failed, in no small measure because of the stiff and determined opposition of the West. But subsequent events in the decade from 1945 to 1955 brought about a change in Soviet tactics and, for the time being, in objectives. By 1955, Soviet Russia had emerged as a powerful nation with her prestige greatly enhanced in Asia and Africa: at the same time, the prestige of the West was in decline. While United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was busily building the "northern tier" of states in the Middle East as a bulwark against Russian expansion, Soviet Russia jumped over the tier and entered the heartland of the Middle East practically by invitation.

The Arab national liberation movement became the instrument for Russian cooperation. Although up to that time the Kremlin had distrusted the national bourgeoisie and refused to work with it even in the colonial territories, after 1955 the bourgeoisie was recognized as revolutionary in its struggle against colonialism and imperialism; and as such was regarded as a desirable and worthy partner, even though it was not socialist in its objectives. In this about-face, Moscow abandoned the local communists: they could either join the nationalist forces or be suppressed by the local authorities.

But what about the revolutionary socialist objective? Was there a danger that after independence was achieved, the bourgeoisie would turn its back on the Soviet Union and join the enemy camp? Sometimes this possibility was wishfully ignored. The immediate objectives, removing the common enemy—the imperialist Western powers—from the area and increasing Soviet prestige and influence, were too important and too attractive to be retarded or perhaps even blocked by such ideological compunctions. At other times, when the danger was clearly pointed out, it was decided to take the chance, with the hope that after independence had been achieved, the leftist elements would gain control of the government.

This hope was based on the general instability of the area. Leadership was weak; mass political parties with a stable public following were nonexistent; the left would be the most daring and the best organized, and would establish dictatorships. The major Soviet objective in cooperating with the national bourgeoisie was the removal of the Western powers from the area; on the other hand, stability and strong leadership from the middle classes of the Middle East were not desirable. In fact, the greater the internal instability and the weaker the bourgeoisie leadership, the greater the Soviet chances to fish for socialist revolution in muddied waters. The best example was Syria: the weakest and the most unstable of the Middle Eastern countries had the strongest communist party of all the Arab states.

But as the Russians planned it, internal instability was not to reach a stage where it would invite external intervention—not even the intervention of one Arab state in the affairs of another—unless such intervention facilitated the ultimate revolutionary objective without at the same time further involving the great powers in the region. While there might be inter-Arab friction and dissension, externally all the Arab states were to be united against a common enemy—the imperialist powers, the former oppressors, the Western powers who were constantly waiting for an opportunity to reestablish themselves in the area and exploit the native Arab states.

Internally, the Soviet Union felt that it would be desirable to encourage the more "progressive," "have-not" Arab states to cast covetous eyes at the more "reactionary" and wealthier states so that, when the ultimate revolution came, the entire area would be ripe for the socialist objective. Thus, from the Soviet viewpoint, it would be desirable for President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) to want the rich oil resources of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and for "progressive" Syria to taunt "reactionary" Jordan. This, however, could be carried too far too soon. Such frictions and clashes might divide the Arabs and divert them from the common enemy, and might even bring

about external intervention. The prime tactic, therefore, was to foster Arab unity as the best instrument against Western imperialism. This tactic was to be prolonged until the internal situation was ready for the leftist takeover.

The Soviet portrait of the true enemy—the imperialists—was very clear. The Arabs needed little encouragement in their common enmity of Israel. Consistently, since 1956, the Soviet Union has taken an anti-Israel, pro-Arab position in all Arab-Israeli disputes and incidents. But presenting Israel as the common enemy would hardly serve the Soviet purpose; the Arabs would concentrate on Israel and would be diverted from the desired Soviet objective; moreover, rampant Arab hostility might eventually lead to external Western intervention. Israel, therefore, was always presented as the agent of imperialist powers, especially the United States.

Even Saudi Arabia, which was supporting the monarchical “reactionary forces” of Yemen, was presented as an unwitting tool of the imperialist powers who were determined to protect their interests, especially oil; the West was exploiting the riches of all the Arabs, and the imperialists had to be fought by all the Arabs.

In the Soviet view, Great Britain is determined to reestablish itself in the area; it is utilizing the South Arabian Federation and sends men and forces from there against the Yemeni republicans. The West, the U.S.S.R. says, is determined to break the United Arab Republic by forcing it to exert its efforts in Yemen on behalf of the Yemenis. Indeed, the Western powers fomented the struggle for Yemen between Saudi Arabia and the U.A.R. for their own selfish ends, and all the Arabs are their victims.

## ARAB UNITY

In January, 1964, in Cairo, Nasser convened the first Arab summit conference, ostensibly to deal with Israel's decision to draw Jordan River waters for irrigation in the Israeli interior, but actually to deal with

many inter-Arab issues. The Soviet press declared almost immediately after the close of the conference that it “was the most representative Arab conference ever,” and pointed out with great satisfaction that one of the major results of the conference was the improvement in relations among the participants. In addition to elaborating reprisal measures against Israel, including military action, the conference discussed ways of strengthening the Arab League states and the “normalization and improvement of relations between the Arab countries, which is undoubtedly the most important result of the conference.”

After the second summit conference, which met in Alexandria in September, 1964, the Soviet press hailed Nasser's “Cairo spirit” of Arab unity. As a result of the summit meetings, relations among the Arab states markedly improved. The “Cairo spirit” was manifested again in August, 1965. Despite what Nasser regarded as the efforts of the Western imperialist powers to prolong the war in Yemen, he tried, through King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, to stop the war. The Jidda agreement signed in August, 1965, brought the war temporarily to an end.<sup>1</sup>

The deepening of the sense of Arab unity was further demonstrated at the third Arab summit conference held in Casablanca in mid-September, 1965. The conference produced two important documents; the Arab Solidarity Charter and the Declaration of the Council of Arab Kings and Heads of State.

Hailing the magnificent achievements of the third summit conference, the Soviet press presented Arab unity as a force of 80 million Arabs who have a common language, culture and historical heritage, long-standing and close political ties, and common aims in the anti-imperialist struggle. In evaluating the summit conferences, *The New Times* (Moscow, September 29, 1965) warned that:

whatever may be the difficulties created by the internal situation in some of the Arab countries, the main danger still emanates from the external imperialist forces. . . . No less important for the Arab countries is the elaboration of a common policy toward Israel and toward the support it gets from the Western Powers.

<sup>1</sup> See also page 103 of this issue.



Notwithstanding some of the difficulties encountered at the Casablanca conference, especially Tunisia's refusal to participate (which was hailed by the American press as a significant achievement), *The New Times* concluded that "the Conference was a big success for the progressive anti-imperialist forces in the Arab world."

The basic approach and the concerted effort of the Soviet Union aimed to present the West as the enemy of Arab unity. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, asserted that it had no ax to grind, no ulterior motives; it urged Arab unity because unity was good for the Arabs, and was therefore ready to support the Arab position against Israel. In discussing the issue of Jordan River waters, *International Affairs* (Moscow, June, 1964) stated:

Israeli diplomacy, for its part, is doing everything within its power, in collusion with its Western allies, to divide the Arab countries and prevent them from forming a united front against the imperialists. . . . The Soviet Union wants a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, and supports the legitimate Arab demands arising from the Israeli imperialist plans to use the Jordan to the detriment of Arab countries.

## REALISM AND SOCIALISM

Russia's pragmatic approach — supporting the Arab national liberation movement in return for Arab support of Soviet foreign policies—of necessity had its limitations. It did not satisfy the ideologists, who pointed out the forever-lurking danger of losing the bourgeoisie to the capitalist world once independence was achieved; it also weakened Soviet Russia's position in the communist world in view of the militant ideological stance of the Chinese communists. But what especially disturbed some Soviet leaders was the fact that in spite of all their efforts to further Arab unity, the Arabs were more divided than ever; they could not be lined up in the Soviet camp as a united front against the West, nor even against Israel. By the 1960's, practically all the Arab countries had achieved independence; unless the socialist phase could soon be introduced and Arab paths of development directed on a noncap-

talist basis, the battle would indeed be lost.

So simultaneously, while still advocating Arab unity—encompassing all Arab countries without distinction of ideological coloring—the "progressive" countries in the Arab world began to gain special Soviet attention and special recognition as leaders of the camp. Needless to say, Egypt occupied the center of the stage in this new constellation. Although the Kremlin planners well knew that Nasser was not a theoretical socialist, he was nevertheless the strongest Arab leader formally talking socialism; he was in command of the greatest and most powerful Arab country with any potential for developing into some sort of socialist state. It was therefore natural that the Soviet press should be preoccupied with Egypt and should subject it to careful examination.

By the end of 1965, Soviet analysts came up with a full evaluation of Egyptian developments and an appreciation of the Arab liberation movement. They saw in Arab nationalism two stages. The first stage was one of "pure" nationalism with one aim: the abolition of alien rule. This stage therefore encompassed different sections of the population, i.e., the working masses, the national bourgeoisie, and even certain feudal elements, because the nationalist revolution had no social program. Once this first stage achieved independence from alien rule, the second stage would, in the Russian view, aim for national independence based on economic and social liberation.

As for Egypt, the analysis theorized that after the revolution of July, 1952, the Free Officers had merely filled a political vacuum. The bourgeois parties had been discredited, and there were no leftist organizations strong enough to replace them. The revolution did not surge from the masses but came from above, from a small group of army officers whose aims were to create a strong, independent, industrial Egypt and to lead the people out of poverty. These were democratic and not socialist aims, and might have been achieved by capitalism, in alliance with the bourgeoisie.

Nonetheless, as one analyst put it,

... the development of the national liberation movement in our day has its own logic. Experience has shown that consistent implementation of democratic reforms is possible only beyond the framework of capitalism and is incompatible with the interest of the exploitive classes.

Behind this somewhat wordy sentence is the assertion that after the revolution Egypt could not have developed in the capitalist pattern because the two major prerequisites for capitalist growth—the industrial proletariat and the bourgeoisie—were not sufficiently developed. As it turned out, Nasser and the other Egyptian leaders rejected capitalism, not because they were Marxists but because they became convinced that their aims for Egypt could not be attained with the cooperation of the bourgeoisie. During the transition from colonial dependence to independent statehood, a “new middle strata” actually administered the government. This strata consisted of intellectuals, civil servants and the officers corps, who were actually petite bourgeoisie, but not yet capitalists.

As a rule, members of this strata do not subscribe to bourgeois ideology. Their credo, in the early stages of revolution, is abstract nationalism, and their goal is a modern society. This strata serves its purpose at the first stage of the revolution; its inner instability and contradictions, however, make it dangerous, for its members may become the victims of the plotting bourgeois counterrevolutionary forces. However, in the first stage of the revolution, they offer leadership.

Thus, in Egypt, the foremost representatives of the nationalist-minded middle strata became the leaders of a social revolution. The first stage, from 1952 to 1956, established political independence and reformed the feudal agrarian system; the second stage, from 1956 to 1961, established economic independence and ended Egypt's exploitation by foreign capital. By 1962, the Egyptian capitalists were completely discredited, and the early concept of the Free Officers—the “harmony of class interests”—was discarded. The new Egyptian social pattern was clear: consistent liquidation of private ownership of the means of production. This process brought

about a basic change in the relationship between the government and the local communists. Reported one of the Soviet analysts:

This leftward shift led the UAR leaders to change their attitude toward the communists. All communists have been released from jail and instructions were issued to find them jobs.

Although at the time of the formation of the Egyptian National Socialist Union, Soviet theoreticians were either silent about the Union or even hostile, by the end of 1965 it was recognized as a great political instrument for organizing the formerly passive masses into conscious builders of the new society, and a potential broad and stable base for the socialist government. Next on the agenda was the reform of the bureaucratic machine to safeguard the state from the possible dangers of the middle strata. Soviet analysts happily reported that the new Egyptian government under Premier Zakaria Muhi ad-Din was engaged in this very task.

The cycle was now complete. The process was inexorable: capitalism was doomed and socialism would triumph if the Soviet Union helped the former colonial or semicolonial societies to advance on the path of noncapitalist development.

## ARAB UNITY & SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

Nonetheless, enthusiastic Soviet support for Arab unity and Nasser's “Cairo spirit” failed. The differences among the various Arab states, their leaders, and their alignments were too strong to contain, even within a fragile framework of formal summit conferences. Internal Arab conflicts far outweighed their drive for an Arab unity based primarily on anti-Western fears, on the one hand, and personal ambitions, on the other. Nor did the internal instability of some individual countries contribute to the sense of unity, as the Soviets had hoped.

Thus, by early 1966, as the Russians saw the situation, the winds of Arab unity would have to blow in a different direction. The new unity would have to be based on social-ideological principles. In other words, “pure” Arab nationalism, even for the purpose of

unity, was doomed. The time had arrived for the Arab social revolution, and unity would have to be based on common social ideologies.

The first open breach in Arab unity-building came on July 23, 1966, when Nasser announced that the U.A.R. would not attend the summit conference scheduled to meet in Algiers, and requested that the conference be postponed indefinitely, because he would not confer with "reactionary elements." According to Soviet reports, nine other Arab states supported Nasser's request, and only Saudi Arabia and Jordan—the reactionaries—opposed the postponement. Tunisia indicated that she would not attend.

The Soviet press saw the disunity as the result of internal Arab division between the noncapitalist countries and the imperialist countries "anxious to pursue feudal practices and block Arab progress." Saudi Arabia, for instance, had spent \$14 million on a propaganda campaign against progressive Arab governments. Saudi Arabia's King Faisal, who had been hailed as a liberal by the same Soviet press when he replaced his reactionary brother, Saud, was now accused of having sponsored the Islamic pact scheme which aimed at uniting Arab reactionary elements against national liberation and democratic movements in the Middle East and North Africa. The Soviet analysts saw no danger, however, of a clash between King Faisal and President Nasser, because the progressive states—the U.A.R., Algeria and Syria—were growing stronger with the "extended cooperation between the progressive Arab states and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries."

The Arab League Council session, which ended on September 13, 1966, was described by the Russians as meeting at a difficult time for inter-Arab relations, with the reactionaries opposing the progressives. The arch-villain, to the Soviets, was Saudi Arabia, which was pressing for the Islamic pact. Jordan, which had recently established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, was described as a victim of Saudi Arabian lures.

Because of the rapid, sudden and unpredictable shifts and changes in Iraq and Syria,

the Soviet analysts had to change positions constantly, not knowing what the morrow would bring. However, two countries could safely be counted in the progressive alignment—Egypt and Algeria—for both seemed to be countries which by the very logic of their situation would find it necessary to follow the noncapitalist path of development. Once in a while, Iraq would be mentioned by the Russians as a member of the progressive bloc, but Iraq's anti-Kurd campaign made it lose favor; Syria might have been considered progressive, but the Baathists—at least the rightist elements—were anathema to Soviet writers and therefore Syria could not be included in the progressive camp. It was not surprising that, when the left Baathists came to power in Syria, and the Iraq government displayed a softer line towards the Kurds, both were included in the progressive bloc. Then, according to the Russians, the consolidation of the progressive states alarmed the reactionary elements, and a plot was hatched. *The New Times* (October 19, 1966), after describing Damascus, Syria, as a mainstay of progressive Arab forces, outlined the plan of the reactionaries:

Some observers suggest that the design is as follows: Israel is to provoke war with Syria; on the pretext of defending Syria, Jordanian troops are to march in; and they are to install a new government in Damascus.

At least for the time being, the Soviet Union has abandoned the encouragement of universal Arab unity in favor of unity based on the "progressive states," which are developing along noncapitalist lines. While there may be Soviet reservations as to the progressive character of Iraq, or even of Syria, at the

*(Continued on page 116)*

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*As this author evaluates the situation, the Israeli reprisal against Jordanian and Syrian forces of November, 1966, revealed that "no Arab state with the exception of Syria is willing to commit itself to a third round of the Palestine war. And this demonstration of Arab attitude . . . will possibly prove to be the long-hoped-for turning point on the tortured road of Arab-Israeli relations."*

## Israel: The Unrelenting Battle

By DWIGHT J. SIMPSON  
*President, Robert College of Istanbul*

ON OCTOBER 16, 1966, an official delegation of the Israeli government, headed by two cabinet ministers, made a pilgrimage to the tiny *Kibbutz* settlement of Sdeh Boker which is situated south of Beersheba on the edge of the Negev Desert. After many speeches and great ceremony, the good wishes of the government and people of Israel were conveyed to David Ben Gurion, on the occasion of his eightieth birthday. Ben Gurion rejoined that he was only 60, explaining that he arrived in Tel Aviv in 1906 and that that year marked his rebirth. Accordingly, he said, his first 20 years in Poland did not count.

It was very much in character for Ben Gurion to have replied, even to a birthday greeting, in a somewhat quarrelsome and unpredictable manner. But, as is generally conceded—even by his political and personal enemies—had David Ben Gurion been an agreeable, predictable man, there probably would be no state of Israel today.

A series of pageants, public rallies and other tributes were staged by the government, not to enhance Ben Gurion's political position but to remind Israelis, especially the youth and the recent immigrants, of the great capacities for leadership and self-sacrifice so pronounced in the older generation of Israeli leaders whose outstanding member was Ben Gurion. The reminder was a rather sad spectacle. Ben

Gurion's enemies regard him as a senile nuisance, living in the past and capable only of a negative obstructionism. Even his followers, who once revered him as the emancipator of the nation and a modern Hebrew prophet, have come to regard him as a political crank since he relinquished the premiership three years ago.

What has happened to Ben Gurion's prestige has also befallen that of much of the rest of Israel's leadership class. Both Ben Gurion and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol are of the generation of Israel's "Founding Fathers"—a generation now rapidly shrinking. There is little doubt among observers of Israeli politics that Prime Minister Eshkol, who is himself nearly 78, is destined to be the last prime minister with any personal knowledge of or participation in the great events of the heroic struggle to found the nation. Obviously, political power will have to pass into the hands of leaders representing the new generation.

But the great dilemma of Israeli politics can be resolved in the form of the blunt question: "Who?" In seeking to answer the question, there is abundant evidence that no single member of the younger group of politicians has established anything remotely resembling an undisputed claim to leadership. For his part, David Ben Gurion, despite the fact that he is the oldest member of the



*Knesset* (parliament), has attempted over the years to identify himself with the more youthful members of the Mapai Party, in particular with Moshe Dayan, the former military chief-of-staff and minister of agriculture, and Shimon Peres, the ex-deputy minister of defense. It is true that the members of this so-called "younger generation" are actually not young but middle-aged. They are in their late forties or early fifties. However, they still would represent a radical change from the current leadership, whose members are mostly in their seventies.

### THE NEW ORDER

Naturally, the expected change of leadership would be in areas of greater importance than the actual ages of the men involved. The younger generation is popularly identified as espousing a strictly pragmatic approach to the problems of political life. It has no observable concern with, and indeed appears to be bored by, the great ideological debates and commitments that so fully preoccupied the "Founding Fathers." Secular minded, the new class of politicians appears to have little understanding of the profoundly religious strain that was so pronounced in its forefathers. Younger politicians react with equal indifference to the standard socialist bias so pronounced among the early Zionists. To the new leaders, socialism is merely a set of economic techniques and tools, not a dogma to which one gives a quasi-religious commitment. And even on the sacrosanct subject of the "Ingathering of the Exiles,"—the Israeli term for the Jewish immigration to Israel—the new leaders appear to justify continued immigration more on the grounds of what the newcomers can do to strengthen the Israeli economy and defense rather than on what the new Zionist state can do to redeem the hardships experienced by Jews in other countries.

Granting almost no exceptions, the younger politicians feel that Levi Eshkol and his generation are prisoners of antiquated and irrelevant ideological slogans. They assert that most of the political energy of Israel is dissipated in doctrinal hair-splitting, a practice

which is as stultifying as it is fruitless. They make the claim, both by implication and by assertion, that Israeli progress toward solution of its basic problems is precluded as long as power remains in the hands of the "old-timers."

For their part, Prime Minister Eshkol and his close colleagues, particularly Pinhas Sapir, the minister of finance, Zalman Aranne, the minister of education, Yigal Allon, the minister of labor, and Golda Meir, the ex-foreign minister, regard the younger politicians as potential national disasters. In Eshkol's view the self-proclaimed pragmatism of his young critics is merely a screen behind which is concealed a glaring lack of principles, no higher moral commitments and, indeed, an absence of conviction of any kind.

However, in spite of his violent reaction to his young critics, Eshkol is at the same time too shrewd and too experienced a politician not to take practical steps to disarm or neutralize his opposition. This was the probable motivation behind his bold step in 1965 to align his own Mapai Party with the Ahdut Avodah, a smaller party. Doubtless the prime minister was seeking to provide a leadership cadre of younger politicians who could be presented to the electorate as an energetic, vigorous alternative to the Dayan-Peres group. Since few such young faces were to be found within the ranks of the Mapai Party, Eshkol very sensibly formed the coalition with Ahdut Avodah, several of whose leaders are not only relatively youthful and forward-looking but who also have national reputations and considerable political experience as well.

The results of the national elections held in late 1965 for the sixth *Knesset* seemed to vindicate Eshkol's strategy and tactics. The Mapai-Ahdut Avodah alignment, whose platform strongly emphasized the youthful "new look" of its membership, won 45 seats (out of a total *Knesset* membership of 120). The Rafi, David Ben Gurion's new party which included the Dayan-Peres group, won only 10 seats, which are far fewer than needed to make the Rafi an effective parliamentary power. Having seemingly bridged the loudly

argued "generational gap," Prime Minister Eshkol was by the spring of 1966 ready to assume comparatively unchallenged control of Israeli political life.

### ECONOMIC HEADACHES

The first great problem with which the new Eshkol government had to wrestle was the rapidly deteriorating health of the Israeli economy. In mid-1966, the prime minister voiced these sentiments:

For the first 18 years of the state's existence, money flowed. We warned until we were hoarse that there were wolves in the forest and that they would strike. But they did not come. Now that the wolves are beginning to show themselves, things are a little different.

By use of colorful metaphor Prime Minister Eshkol well described the acute danger that confronts Israel. For a prolonged period, Israel has received a heavy volume of loans and gifts of hard currency from abroad. In the past decade the two principal sources of these funds have been German (reparations paid by the West German government to the Israeli government on behalf of victims of Nazi persecution) and American (easy-term loans from the United States government and very generous gifts from the American Jewish community). A considerable amount of this money went into industrial and agricultural expansion which resulted in a healthy increase of production for the vital export trade.

Unfortunately, however, a far too high percentage of the money was spent on consumers goods and personal consumption. This vast purchasing power in the hands of the Israeli consumer, linked with a well-established preference for foreign imported goods over local manufactures, caused the Israeli foreign trade account to go massively into deficit. As long as the golden flow of foreign monies to Israel continued, the annual deficit could be made up by this means and the day of financial reckoning postponed. But by 1966, with German reparations fully completed and with the volume of American support substantially reduced, the day of reckoning was at hand. In Prime Minister Eshkol's terms, the "wolves," in the form of

insistent foreign bankers and creditors, had come out of the forest and were indeed ready to strike.

It remained to be seen if the Eshkol government could muster the considerable courage necessary to enforce any stern measures for remedy. Moreover, it was not yet clear whether the Israeli electorate would swallow the bitter medicine the economic doctors might prescribe. In October of 1966 the prime minister made a promising beginning by bluntly telling a nationwide radio audience why it could not have the economic prosperity and abundance he had promised during the recently concluded election campaign. The outlines of a new economic policy were announced, including the declaration that economic activity was to be reduced by checking the growth of domestic consumption, residential building and "investment not contributing to export expansion." Investment and labor were to be diverted to export industries, with wages and incomes to rise slowly, if at all, over the next three years, and with labor productivity to be increased and management methods rationalized. The declaration went on to say that official monetary policy would be used to "decrease the inflationary pressures," and that, for the unemployment that would naturally result if the proposed draconian measures were actually implemented, there would be a series of temporary relief projects in the form of needed public works.

Under this new economic policy, the rapid expansion of exports, which is to be the central objective of the entire reform program, is to be encouraged by a somewhat complicated system of incentive payments for investors and producers in export industries. Exporters will receive important tax refunds and concessions concerning fringe benefits. Altogether, the government intends to spend approximately \$20 million annually on this incentive program. Some gauge of the importance of this sum is provided by comparing it to the total value of Israeli exports for 1965—\$370 million.

Meanwhile, unemployment in Israel has already reached levels never previously ex-

perienced. Minister of Labor Yigal Allon reported in mid-1966 that the unemployment level of 33,000 reached the previous year had already climbed to 51,000 and, on the basis of his projections, would reach 70,000 before the spring of 1967. When contrasted with the size of the Israeli labor force (approximately 650,000), it is clear that serious unemployment is already a characteristic of the Israeli economy. However, in typical Israeli defiance of standard economic "laws" and practices, the wage costs of labor are skyrocketing at the very time when unemployment is widespread. Surprising as it may seem to more orthodox economic observers, the government officially stipulated a 10 per cent wage rise in 1966. In practice, the official stipulation was exceeded on an average of 5 per cent so that 1966 wage costs rose approximately 15 per cent. Moreover, the agreement for 1967 provides for a further rise of 5 per cent in basic pay for all wage earners plus a substantial cost-of-living allowance. Given the experience of previous years, it is easily predictable that the total increase of wage costs in 1967 will again be 15 per cent.

Pinhas Sapir, the minister of finance, put the problem very succinctly: "We must export more and our exports must bear competitive prices. The best export premium is to cut production expense." How to translate this impeccable advice into practice remained the key problem. The government achieved some small success in channeling investment in the right direction during 1966, but not on a scale that could solve its problems. It is true that Prime Minister Eshkol has succeeded in creating an atmosphere in which economic problems can be analyzed more dispassionately. But prices of everything continue to rise, and the minor incentives offered to exporters almost certainly will not solve but will only palliate the problem.

It is obvious that Israel therefore is gambling heavily that its recent application for associate membership in the European Economic Community (Common Market) will be successful. The key to the Israeli position was provided in the statement made by the Israeli ambassador to the E.E.C., Amiel

Najar, as he presented his country's application: "Israel needs a link with a larger economic unit to develop her industry and her agriculture." What the ambassador left unsaid was that Israel, under its trade agreements with the E.E.C. which are due to expire in 1967, was already running an annual trade deficit of \$100 million with the community. If the community does not renew the agreements and also refuses Israel's application for associate membership, the long-predicted catastrophic collapse of the Israeli economy might result. It is by no means certain that the negotiations will have an outcome favorable to Israel. Observers in Brussels, knowing the attitude of the E.E.C.'s council of ministers, regard Israel's chances of being granted associate membership as very slight. The same observers feel that for Israel to achieve even a renewal of its trade agreements, it will first have to balance its trade accounts with the E.E.C., as well as offer convincing assurances concerning any further heavy indebtedness. Given its desultory and somewhat halfhearted attempts at domestic economic reform, it seems unlikely that Israel can achieve its intended goal. If the decision of the E.E.C. is based sheerly on economic and trade considerations, the likelihood of a refusal of the Israeli request is overwhelming. It remains to be seen if other, noneconomic, factors can be brought to bear by Israel to help tip the scales in its favor.

#### **A NEW CANAL: DREAM OR REALITY?**

Nearly everything in Israel must be analyzed in terms of international affairs and nowhere is this truer than in the area of the Israeli economy. Ironically, it is just possible that a development in the United Arab Republic may eventually prove to have an important positive effect on the entire Israeli economic structure.

A very serious problem now looms on the Egyptian economic horizon. The great Suez Canal—which President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized in 1956 and has operated so successfully since that date that the 1965 revenues set an all-time peak of \$197 million—is in danger of being overtaken by competi-

tion. The great question mark that hangs over the future of the canal is posed by the recent development of gigantic oil tankers. Approximately 85 per cent of the Suez Canal's revenues come from the oil trade between Europe and the Persian Gulf. The canal, however, can accommodate only oil tankers which, in comparative terms, are "middle-sized" or even "small." These are tankers ranging from 50,000 to 90,000 tons with a draft of from 30 to 45 feet. In the past two years Japanese shipyards have been building a large number of tankers ranging from 150,000 to 200,000 ton capacity. Even larger tankers are on order, and the great Ishiwakawa shipyards are constructing 6 tankers of 270,000 tons each for the American Bulk Carriers Corporation and 9 tankers of 300,000 tons each for the American Gulf Oil Company.

These colossal ships will have a draft of approximately 100 feet. Moreover, the experts of the oil transport companies have calculated that it would be far cheaper to send these supertankers to Europe via the Cape of Good Hope than to continue sending smaller vessels through the canal. Thus, the only way for the Suez Canal to remain competitive would be for the Egyptians to enlarge and deepen the waterway so that it could successfully cope with the supertankers. A rough preliminary estimate of the costs for such a project, which in effect would mean an entire rebuilding of the canal, indicates that Egypt would have to raise at least \$1.5 billion. Given the worldwide shortage of liquid finance capital and given the dubious capacity of Egypt to repay such a sum, it is unlikely that financing for the project could come from Western sources. With the U.S.S.R. already heavily committed in support of Egypt's Aswan Dam, Russian assistance is even less likely. Enigmatic Red China's ability to finance such a project is highly problematic. Given such an outlook, and remembering that supertanker competition is growing ever more fierce, it is apparent that the United Arab Republic's major revenue source is in grave danger.

Egypt's looming misfortune has given great

stimulus to Israeli planners who have presented a proposal which, if fully adopted, would entirely revitalize the Israeli nation. It is a detailed plan for an Israeli "second Suez Canal" to traverse the Negev Desert from about 12 miles south of Tel Aviv on the Mediterranean coast to the Red Sea port of Eilat, a distance of approximately 180 miles. Proposals for a Negev canal are not new. They date back at least to 1884. But the continued refusal of President Nasser of the United Arab Republic to grant Israel any shipping rights in the Suez Canal has given Israel an active interest in the possibilities of such a project. Indeed, in 1954, the then Israeli minister of development, Dov Joseph, ordered an engineering and cost accounting survey of the project. At that time the engineering report was pessimistic. It was pointed out that the canal would require a system of 22 locks, making it economically impracticable because of the extended passage for the vessels and making it too vulnerable to enemy bombing attacks or to sabotage. Piercing a tunnel through the Negev mountain range—an alternative solution—seemed to Joseph too expensive. Now, however, he and most other knowledgeable Israeli experts agree that in light of new factors, especially those bearing on the Suez Canal, the Negev canal proposal takes on immense importance.

At this juncture the plan for a Negev canal, presented by Russian-born Israeli engineer Ueir Batz, is of paramount interest. Batz is chief engineer for the Negev area of southern Israel and also heads the government's town planning agency for that region. Acknowledging the not unimportant geographical, geological and technical difficulties, Batz has submitted a detailed plan calling for a canal 180 miles long and 460 feet wide—enough to allow two-way passage for the largest ships now built or contemplated. Most important, the Negev canal would have a depth adequate to accommodate the largest of the supertankers.

Batz does not advise a lock-studded canal; but he foresees a 25-mile tunnel through the 1,969-foot-high mountain range. He has calculated that if the canal were to be started



in 1970 it could be completed and fully operational within five to seven years. Moreover, he envisions the annual movement of 60 million tons of shipping through the canal. This would make it possible to amortize the costs of the canal within 25 years. If anything, his traffic projections seem cautious. Most experts feel that, with the anticipated growth in traffic, by the year 2,000 both the existing Suez and the projected Negev canals would probably have difficulty in coping with all the shipping. It is known that the Batz plan is under close government study and the entire country is awaiting a decision with great interest.

### WIDER HORIZONS

Israeli attention was momentarily diverted in 1966 from the standard problems of politics and economics by the sensational announcement of the Swedish Academy that Shmuel Yosef Agnon, who is 78 and lives in Jerusalem, had been awarded the Nobel prize for literature together with another Jewish author, Nellie Sachs, who is 75 and lives in Stockholm. Agnon, who writes in Hebrew and whose works are required reading in Israel's secondary schools and universities, was instantly transformed into an Israeli national hero.

Another Israeli writer, Shmuel Segev, recently published a study entitled *Vietnam—Between Peace and War* which also caused something of a sensation, with the revelation that after World War II, when David Ben Gurion and the Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh were fellow revolutionaries in Paris, plotting their people's independence, the two leaders actually lived in the same hotel and became close friends. Ho Chi Minh, it seems, invited Ben Gurion, who was then an outstanding Zionist and chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive and a fugitive from Palestine, to set up a Jewish government in exile on Vietnam soil. In the intervening years, of course, much has changed. Today there are not even diplomatic relations between Israel and North Vietnam, and Ho Chi Minh has denounced Israel as an imperialist base for aggression in the Middle East.

Ho Chi Minh's current appraisal of Israel indeed differs little from that frequently expressed by the leaders of the various Arab states who are Israel's neighbors in the Middle East. Arab intransigence is basically unchanged, and opposition to the existence of Israel given its present boundaries is the single rallying point around which all Arab countries can unite, at least rhetorically. However, by the end of 1966, it was clear that relations within the Arab world had significantly changed. President Gamal Abdel Nasser's dominant position had been badly impaired, perhaps undermined, by a costly and seemingly endless war in the Yemen. Israel's neighbors also had been split into two mutually antagonistic camps—the monarchists or conservatives represented by Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Tunisia, and the leftist bloc led by the United Arab Republic, Syria and Iraq.

Throughout 1966, after several years of relative quiet, there was a prolonged series of violent incidents along Israel's borders. Major General Itzhak Rabin, Israeli chief-of-staff, in a public statement, analyzed the problem and declared that the major threat to Israel was no longer Egypt but Syria. According to General Rabin, the great bulk of the terrorists operating along Israel's borders were former Palestinians. Although they sometimes staged their raids from Jordanian soil, sometimes from Lebanese, their main base of operations was Syria and their whole effort had direct and important Syrian sponsorship. General Rabin attributed to the Arab guerrilla forces the following line of reasoning:

We cannot wait for the Arab Governments to agree and find the right time to invade Israel

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Dwight James Simpson is a political scientist with many years' experience in the Middle East. His most recent visit to Israel included a thorough inspection of the Negev region of that country. Prior to his appointment to Robert College, he was chairman of the Area Studies Program at Williams College.

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*Focusing on the two Arab nations of Iraq and Kuwait, this Middle East expert finds that, although they have had "essentially similar problems of social reconstruction, Iraq embarked on a revolutionary course of social change . . . while Kuwait moved more cautiously . . . through the slow parliamentary procedure."*

## Political Trends in Iraq and Kuwait

By MAJID KHADDURI

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NO TWO NEIGHBORING countries have followed so radically different approaches to reform as Iraq and Kuwait. This is true despite their common cultural and historical backgrounds and the intimate connections between their two peoples. Not only has Iraq itself followed a revolutionary program in recent years, but it also adopted an aggressive policy toward prosperous Kuwait—just at the time the latter achieved full international status.<sup>1</sup> After eight years' experience with violent changes, there are indications now that Iraq is anxious to assimilate new ideas and reform measures by peaceful methods, as well as to mend its relations with its neighbors. On the other hand, Kuwait has preferred to follow a peaceful approach to social reform and has achieved tremendous progress during the past five years since its independence.

Iraq may be regarded as an example par excellence of recurrent political upheaval, both civil and military. Egypt, in contrast, though experiencing political upheavals before Iraq, has proven relatively quiet in com-

parison. In recent times, Egypt has had only three major political uprisings—in 1880, 1919 and 1952—while Iraq, since independence in 1932, has had more than a dozen political upheavals and, before independence, the tribal communities in the Kurdish and Middle Euphrates areas had been in a state of constant social unrest.

The first political upheaval occurred soon after Iraq was detached from the Ottoman Empire in 1920. After a short period of peace, under the British mandate, Iraq became independent in 1932 and the external check against the revolutionary trend was removed. More than a dozen military coups have occurred since 1932, two-thirds of them either because leading army officers decided to replace one unpopular government with another or because the military desired direct control of authority. Except for one cabinet headed by a civilian premier in 1965–1966, Iraq has been governed by army officers since 1958.

The first military coup d'état took place in 1936 and ever since coups have been recurring in a cyclical form: the coups (tribal or military) before the war recurred in a two-year cycle; those after the war in an almost four-year cycle. The most important of these was the military revolution of 1958 which not only caused the fall of the monarchical system, but

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<sup>1</sup> No sooner had Britain recognized the independence of Kuwait on June 19, 1961 (in the meantime terminating the protectorate which had been established nearly three-quarters of a century before in 1899), than Kuwait faced the threat of annexation from the Iraqi military regime under Abdul Karim Kassam.

also introduced social measures which have served to orient the new regime toward state socialism.

### **FUNDAMENTALS IN IRAQ**

Two fundamental and closely-related questions might be examined. First, what were the principal objectives of the military in their intervention in politics; and, secondly, to what extent has the military regime (or regimes) established after the revolution of 1958 been able to achieve those objectives.

One of the most important objectives for all the army officers was the establishment of a modern national state. Not only the army and other revolutionary leaders but also moderate, and even some religious, elements advocated this principle. However, whether Iraq should form a separate national state or remain part of a larger Arab state comprising some or all the other Arab countries was a question which was not resolved in the minds of the army officers and proved to be one cause of the dissension and counter coups after the revolution of 1958.

No less important an objective was the adoption of socialistic measures. The principle of socialism was closely related to the scheme of Arab unity advocated by nationalist leaders, but those who advocated unity with the United Arab Republic were not all in favor of socialism after President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt had issued his socialistic decrees of 1961. Thus, socialism became another bone of contention in Iraq and accentuated the rift among the Iraqi revolutionary leaders. Coups and counter coups took place as each clique of army leaders attempted to implement its own policy.

Soon after the revolution of 1958 broke out, radical ideological groups, long suppressed under the prerevolutionary regime, came out into the open and took advantage of the freedom given by the revolutionary leaders. Both communists and the Baathists (Pan-Arab Socialists) campaigned for the victory of their parties and approached the army officers for their support. The revolutionary leaders were divided and an intense struggle ensued between the faction that supported Baathists

—who advocated union with the United Arab Republic—and those who supported communists, who advocated a separate existence for Iraq and friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Unable to reconcile the two factions, General Abdul Karim Kassem, head of the military government and chief author of the revolution of 1958, tried to play off one faction against the other in order to maintain his control over the situation. The Pan-Arab group, unable to overthrow Kassem was suppressed in March, 1959, by an alliance between Kassem and the communists. In fact, to foreign observers in 1959–1960, Iraq appeared to be falling into the hands of communists. But no sooner had the Pan-Arabs been weakened than Kassem turned against the communists and began to restrict their activities. During 1961–1963, both communists and Pan-Arabs were almost equally weakened, but Kassem, though retaining power over both parties, lost the confidence of both. The ideological struggle continued and each faction, afraid lest the other attain victory, preferred to see Kassem in the saddle. But he was in a very precarious position, having failed to build a party of his own strong enough to supersede these two rival parties.

One of the methods by which Kassem tried to create strong public support was by diverting the focus of attention from home affairs to regional Arab affairs. He made statements relating to the Palestine issue and claimed that he was contemplating a plan for the restoration of Arab Palestine to its rightful people. The Mufti of Jerusalem, who was opposed to President Nasser, visited Baghdad in 1961, but nothing definite materialized. More sensational was Kassem's claim to Kuwait, which had just become independent following Britain's withdrawal in June, 1961—this on the ground that Kuwait formed part of Iraq before both countries were detached from the Ottoman Empire after World War I. The proclamation of reunion might have been welcomed in Iraq had it been made in more auspicious circumstances and in a friendly manner acceptable to Kuwait; but Kassem unwittingly issued his decrees of reunion in a blunt and insulting manner which

neither the people of Kuwait nor Iraq liked—then or now. He thus aroused the suspicion of the people of Kuwait and involved Iraq unnecessarily in diplomatic complications with Great Britain, Kuwait's foreign protector. As was expected, Kassem failed in his objective, but his move had a far-reaching effect on the internal development of Kuwait, as will be noted later.

### THE BAAATHIST COUP

In February, 1963, the Baath Party, in an alliance with the Pan-Arab faction of the Iraqi army, precipitated a coup d'état which overthrew the Kassem regime. The Baath Party, originally organized in Syria, was dedicated to the principles of Arab unity and socialism. The Iraqi Baathist leaders, once in power, sought to achieve unity with the United Arab Republic in order to strengthen their hold over their country before introducing socialist measures. But it was known that Baathist socialist measures would soon follow, and this adversely affected the internal economic situation. Negotiations with Egypt, in which the Syrian Baathist leaders also took an active part, brought nothing beyond pious statements of unity, because the Syrian leaders who participated in the Syro-Egyptian union of 1958 were lukewarm to unity under Nasser's leadership. In sum, the Iraqi Baathists failed to achieve their national objectives and proved to be entirely inexperienced in conducting the business of government with a minimum of order and efficiency. On the contrary, although having suffered oppression at the hand of communists under the Kassem regime, they counteracted by inaugurating a regime of terrorism and vindictiveness against all who held leftist and liberal ideas, regardless of whether they took part in communist activities or not.

The Baathists cooperated with Colonel Abdul Salam Arif, coauthor of the revolution of 1958, who was dropped by Kassem for his Pan-Arab ideas, and helped install him as

their government's figurehead. Very soon Arif discovered the weakness of the Baath and, in November, 1963, moved to overthrow their regime by rallying moderate elements in the army. Thus, the Baath regime ended, having lasted only eight months (February–November, 1963) and contributing virtually nothing constructive to the country.

### IRAQ UNDER ARIF

President Arif proved to be more clever than the group that brought him to power and, after the take-over, he was able to consolidate his position by placing his supporters in key positions of power and removing those opposed to him. More important were his socialistic decrees, nationalizing the banks and private companies in July, 1964—measures which satisfied the clamours of Baathists and other Arab nationalists desiring socialism, as well as unity with the United Arab Republic.

But Arif did nothing concrete about unity, although he declared his belief in it in no uncertain terms when he visited Egypt in May, 1964, for the inauguration of the Aswan Dam. Outwardly, Arif continued to espouse Arab unity<sup>2</sup> and agreed to set up a joint presidential council in the fall of 1964 which was to prepare plans for ultimate unity, although the council remained only a symbol of unity, devoid of actual powers. Nor were Arif's moves towards socialism derived from a genuine desire to follow in Egypt's footsteps, for he realized that in a potentially rich and underpopulated country like Iraq, free enterprise would be more helpful for economic development than socialism.

More serious for Arif was the problem of Kurdish opposition to the transformation of Iraq from a state comprising Arabs and Kurds, into a region of the United Arab Republic. The Kurds had already become conscious of their nationalism and, after 1958, demanded that they should be given an autonomous regime within the Iraqi unity. Arif, realizing the difficulty of coping with the clashes between the Kurds and the Iraqi army which had begun during the Kassem regime, came to terms with the Kurds early in 1966 by giving them concessions of provin-

<sup>2</sup> In reality, however, Arif was lukewarm to unity with the United Arab Republic and intimated to some of his close associates that Nasser was "incapable of governing Iraq."



cial autonomy and asserting the maintenance of Iraqi unity.

Nor was that all. Arif moved to entrust the premiership to a civilian politician, hoping that the army might gradually be isolated from politics. However, his intentions became known to leading army officers. When he entrusted the vice-premiership to a civilian, Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz, in the fall of 1965, the then premier, Abdul al-Razzaq Arif, incited some of the army officers to raise a rebellion against President Arif while he was out of the country attending Arab "summit meetings" in Morocco. The chief-of-staff, the president's brother, quickly suppressed the rebellion and, on his return, President Arif entrusted the premiership to Bazzaz.

### **A SECOND ARIF**

When President Abdul Salam Arif died, in a helicopter crash in April, 1966, his brother, Abdul al-Rahman Arif, was elected president. Bazzaz remained as prime minister and continued to work to restore confidence in business, inspire efficiency in the administration and to consolidate power in the hands of civilian politicians by holding elections for a national assembly. His statements about overhauling the regime worried some army officers, but his public statements and speeches explaining his policy made over radio and television aroused great interest and enhanced his prestige throughout the country.

However, leading army officers and Arab nationalists who desired the implementation of the socialistic decrees and unity with the United Arab Republic remained dissatisfied with Bazzaz whom they denounced as lacking in enthusiasm for Arab unity and as neutralizing Arab socialism. They brought pressure to bear on the new president who found he could not ignore the weight of the army in domestic politics. Matters then came to a head on the question of whether ex-Premier Abdul al-Razzaq Arif and the group who threatened rebellion should be brought to trial

or pardoned. The army officers demanded pardon, but Bazzaz insisted on judicial procedure. In August, 1966, President Arif, in an effort to prevent the recurrence of political upheavals, hinted to Bazzaz that he should resign. Bazzaz immediately tendered his letter of resignation. It was the first change of government without violence since 1958.

President Arif invited Naji Talib to form the new government. It was a happy compromise. For Talib was a former army officer with a good record. He was one of the officers who took an active part in the overthrow of the pre-1958 regime and participated in the initial stage of the revolution under Kassem, but later resigned in protest against Kassem's policy of support for leftist elements. Although he is known to favor unity with the United Arab Republic and Arab socialism, his views are moderate in tone and his handling of rival groups and personalities is dexterous. Moreover, he belongs to the Shia community which had been antagonized by extreme elements asserting Sunni viewpoints.<sup>3</sup> However, Talib's task of steering the ship of state in troubled waters has not proven to be an easy one. He has to satisfy opposing ideological groups as well as to deal with pressing economic problems not tractable to ideological solutions. The fate of his government will probably be dependent more on his ability to keep a balance between competing groups than on achieving ideological national objectives.

### **TRENDS IN KUWAIT**

In contrast with Iraq, neighboring Kuwait has so far presented a picture of peaceful change in its move from a patriarchal to a modern constitutional system. The experiences of Iraq proved to be a useful lesson for Kuwait. More important, perhaps, was Kassem's threat to annex Kuwait—a threat which inspired its rulers to grant liberal concessions to the people, in order to demonstrate that the political freedom and civil rights provided by the Kuwaiti structure could not be met under the Iraqi political system. Moreover, the immense oil royalties, previously spent without check by the ruling Sheiks, were brought

<sup>3</sup> The Shiis and the Sunnis are the two main Muslim sects in Iraq. While the Shiis are more numerous, the Sunnis have generally predominated politically.—Editor's note.

under parliamentary supervision and censorship. Even before Great Britain relinquished her protection over the country, it was realized that popular check over expenditure of public monies would have to be exercised if the ruling family were to maintain its position. The Sheik of Kuwait, Abdullah al-Salim al-Sabah,<sup>4</sup> appreciating the new forces that came into his country, wisely decided that his kingdom's political system must keep pace with social and economic progress. It was perhaps the liberal constitutional rights which the Sheik promised his people that most aroused them against Iraq and it became incumbent on the Sheik to take the initiative and reorganize the internal structure of his country in accordance with modern constitutional patterns.

### CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

The story of this reform may be summarized as follows: On August 26, 1961, two months after Kuwait's rise to statehood, the Sheik issued an order calling for the election of a constituent assembly and appointed an organizing committee for carrying out the elections. An electoral law was issued on October 7, 1961, stipulating that all citizens who had reached 30 years of age and could read and write would be eligible for election. Only male citizens, however, who reached 21 years were given the right of franchise. Elections were held in December, 1961, and the constituent assembly met on January 20, 1962, opened officially by the Sheik. Early in January, the Sheik had issued several orders, one of them, putting into force temporary constitutional laws until the constituent assembly promulgated the constitution; another, proclaiming regulations for the organization of a provisional government; and another, appointing a provisional government which was charged with the exercise of executive powers until the new government would assume power under the constitution. The constituent assembly was expected to complete its work within a year from its first

meeting on January 20, 1962. Within less than a year, assisted by a constitutional committee and legal experts, the constituent assembly completed its drafting of the constitution, drawing on the constitutional experiences of other Arab countries as well as on Western experience. The Sheik, without alteration, approved the draft and promulgated the constitution on November 11, 1962.

The constitution, embodying a set of fundamental principles based on Arab custom and modern constitutional novelties, provided a compromise which made concessions to realities. It recognized monarchical rule, based on Arab tradition and local support of the ruling dynasty; but it also declared the system of government to be "democratic, under which the sovereignty resides in the people, the source of all powers." Kuwait is declared to be an Arab state, independent and fully sovereign; but its people, in the meantime, is recognized as "a part of the Arab nations." "Neither its sovereignty nor any part of its territory may be relinquished" in favor of another state (Article 1). Islam is declared to be the religion of the state, and Islamic law the main source of legislation. The constitution also embodied a bill of rights, recognizing basic liberties for the people and providing guarantees for the protection of these rights by the state.

Executive powers are entrusted to the hands of the Amir, the head-of-state, and a responsible cabinet. After "the traditional consultations," he appoints the prime minister and relieves him of office. He also appoints the ministers and relieves them of office upon the recommendation of the prime minister. He can declare defensive war by decree, but, according to the constitution, "offensive war is prohibited." The cabinet, composed of a number of ministers not to exceed one-third of the number of the national assembly, is appointed from among the members of the assembly and others. It is responsible to the Amir both collectively for the general policy of the state and individually for the affairs of each ministry. In the meantime the cabinet is subject to censure by the assembly and each minister is responsible to it for the affairs of

<sup>4</sup> He passed away on November 24, 1965, and was succeeded by the Crown Prince Sheik Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah.

his ministry. The national assembly is composed of fifty members elected for four years, and eligible for reelection. The assembly meets annually in October and continues for eight months, unless the meeting is prorogued for further work. Members of the assembly have absolute freedom of speech and enjoy parliamentary immunity. Legislation may be initiated by the cabinet or by any member of the assembly. The Amir can also legislate by issuing decrees having the force of law during the absence of the national assembly; but such decrees must be submitted to the assembly when it convenes for either approval or repeal. Judicial power is to be immune from interference by the executive and a supreme council is responsible for judicial matters. A council of state is to assume the functions of administrative jurisdiction, render legal advice and draft bills and regulations needed for legislation by the cabinet or the national assembly. Finally, the Amir as well as one-third of the members of the assembly have the right to propose constitutional amendments.

The first election for the national assembly was held on January 23, 1963. The country was divided into ten areas, each having five seats to fill in the assembly. About 210 candidates presented themselves for election, out of which 50 were elected. The candidates represented no official political parties, since such bodies did not exist, but they represented certain shades of opinion, ranging from a call for Arab unity to quick internal reforms in Kuwait society. After the election, the members of the assembly quickly began to work through the various committees and participated in lively debates on foreign policy, financial matters, and internal administration. The government has proved to be reasonably able to steer its way safely between parliamentary supervision and responsibility to the head-of-state, and the experiences through which it is passing may well strengthen its ability to accomplish its tasks with greater efficiency and satisfaction. The relative stability, and balance of forces, that Kuwait has achieved in such a short period is perhaps an encouraging sign that

Kuwait may be able to achieve the still needed social adjustment and more equitable distribution of values and privileges without political upheaval.

## CONCLUSION

Although Iraq and Kuwait have essentially similar problems of social reconstruction, Iraq embarked on a revolutionary course of social change under the impact of ideological propaganda while Kuwait moved more cautiously to adopt social reform measures through the slow parliamentary procedure. Thus, the two countries represent two approaches to social reform neither one of which has been regarded as absolutely satisfactory. Arab socialism in Iraq has retarded the progress of a country which is potentially rich and the leaders of the revolution of 1958 have not yet been able to adapt their ideological objectives to meet the needs and aspirations of the people. Until this is achieved, Iraq will remain in a state of social unrest.

Like Iraq, Kuwait possesses the riches needed for social reform, and has indeed achieved tremendous progress during the short period since independence in 1961. The external threat which inspired the ruling class to give liberal concessions has disappeared and there are signs that the present freedom for the expression of political opinion may not keep pace with social progress. Political parties have not yet developed, but an opposition parliamentary bloc has emerged reflecting the dissatisfaction with the slow parliamentary procedure and demanding

*(Continued on page 115)*

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*"Egypt today faces serious demographic and economic problems." However, as this observer notes, "a number of favorable factors exist which . . . will in the long run offset most of Egypt's acute problems."*

# The New Egypt After 1952

By CHRISTINA PHELPS HARRIS

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IN JULY, 1952, the "Free Officers" of Egypt led by Mohammed Naguib took over the government of King Farouk. This military coup marked the most important event in the Middle East since the collapse of the Ottoman Turkish Empire during World War I. The Revolution thus begun inaugurated a program of total reform which has quickened an ancient society into new life.

Egypt's place on the map, at the crossroads between Asia and Africa, underlines the importance of a country which has given the world almost 6,000 years of recorded history. Egypt is in the northeast corner of Africa, but its historical relations have been forged primarily with the Middle East and Mediterranean worlds. At the time of the Crusades, Egypt became the cynosure of Western eyes. In 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte ventured to expand his politico-military career by the conquest of Egypt. This French occupation lasted only four years, but it initiated the first close contact between Egyptians and Europeans. From that time forward, Egypt became the focus of competing European political ambitions in the East, which were accompanied all too frequently by financial exploitation. In the mid-nineteenth century a French engineer obtained a concession to dig the Suez Canal—with Egyptian labor. In 1869, this link between the Mediterranean and the Red Seas was opened to international traffic. And, because the canal provided the

shortest sea route between Europe and India and the Far East, Egypt was brought into the vortex of "great power" politics. Inevitably, its freedom and potential independence were limited.

In 1882, during the Arabi rebellion,\* Great Britain occupied Egypt. Concern for the uninterrupted use of the new road to India was Britain's primary motive; strategic and commercial interests required, in the thinking of imperial statesmen, that no power should be stronger than Britain in Egypt. Under British indirect rule—for the country remained juridically a part of the Ottoman Empire—Egypt was rescued from bankruptcy and placed on a sound financial and economic basis. But material prosperity was not enough. The impact of the West was many-faceted; it was cultural as well as political and economic. The impetus toward modernization carried with it new ideas, including concepts of the French Revolution. As European education began to spread, first through the cities, Western political ideas began to make their way—not only among the Christian and Jewish minority communities (only some 8 per cent of the total population), but also among the vast Muslim majority.

The education and modernization of the Muslims of Egypt were initiated by the first and the greatest of Egyptian religious reformers, Sheik Muhammad Abduh. By 1906, educated young Egyptians, carried forward irresistibly on the crest of a nationalist tide, opposed the British with increasing vigor.

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\* Editor's note: The revolt was led by Colonel Ahmad Arabi.



After the end of World War I the nationalists won for their country a limited autonomy in domestic affairs; but the most important fact of modern Egyptian political life continued to be the nature of its relationship with Great Britain. Even when the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 gave the country its independence, articles of this treaty tied the foreign policy of Egypt to British interests; while military annexes gave Britain the right to continue to maintain troops in the Suez Canal Zone.

One other fact needs to be noted: Egypt is today and has always been an exceptionally homogeneous state. The country itself is over 386,000 square miles in area, but the populated and cultivable area which constitutes the heart of the state is small. About 96 per cent of Egypt is unreclaimed desert. The state is *linear*, resting on a 700-mile ribbon of the Nile River. Along this river and in its widespreading delta, the people of Egypt live on an incredibly fertile soil; only a small minority—about 13 per cent of them—live outside of this area, scattered among the oases of the western desert, along the coasts and in the Sinai Peninsula. Egyptians make their living from only about six million acres of cultivable land. Moreover, from the time of the Pharaohs, they have inherited a tradition of a strong central government; and the tradition is coupled with a conviction that this type of government spells prosperity for them. Because theirs is a *hydraulic* society, it is dependent upon efficient centralized control of the country's whole irrigation system. Finally, more than 91 per cent of Egypt's 30 million people are Sunni Muslims. These facts of life, taken together, spell an impressive degree of cultural unity. And this sense of identity has served to support the leaders of the Revolution.

## CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTION

In July, 1952, the government of Egypt was unstable and had forfeited popular confidence. The causes for the Revolution—the *need* for one—included a host of political, social and economic grievances. Political charges against the king's government may be

summarized thus: British troops were still in the Canal Zone; Egypt had repudiated, unilaterally, the unexpired Anglo-Egyptian treaty (in 1951), but the British still stood firm on their rights under the 1936 treaty and ignored Egypt's action. The king thereby lost all British support without gaining the goodwill of Egyptian nationalists.

Egypt was rapidly drifting into anarchy. King Farouk himself headed a police state; and the Egyptians passionately rejected his corrupt and incompetent rule. Furthermore, Egyptians could not forget that the king had committed his army, totally unprepared and ill-equipped, to the Arab-Israeli war of 1948; and that the palace had been implicated in the arms scandal during that war. In the economic field, cotton scandals—manipulation of the cotton futures, involving many high-ranking members of the government—had jeopardized 85 per cent of Egypt's export trade; and the country was in a state of financial and administrative chaos.

The greatest ills of the country, however, were socio-economic. Egypt actually had a two-class society: the very rich and the very poor. The first, an elite group composed of successful bankers, businessmen, merchants and the great landlords, monopolized the wealth of Egypt; this group also held a monopoly of political power in the country and in parliament, so that it could and did sabotage urgently needed reform measures—notably for the relief of the peasantry—for which some enlightened Egyptians had long been working. The very poor, mostly landholding or landless peasants, constituted close to three-quarters of the population. Their lives and their livelihood were awesomely circumscribed by poverty, ignorance and disease. Disparities in property distribution were extreme. About 2.75 million Egyptians owned land, but 70 per cent of these owned less than *half* an acre each. A few of the great landlords, on the other hand, owned as much as 18,000 acres. One and one-half million agricultural laborers owned no land at all, and the surplus labor in rural districts was reckoned at between 5 and 6 million peasants.

But the gravest of all Egypt's socio-economic problems was, and is, the population explosion. The population had more than doubled between 1900 and 1952, and it was increasing at the rate of more than 500,000 people a year. This rate of growth greatly exceeded the rate of increase in agricultural production.

A secret army organization, soon to be known as the Free Officers, was the instrument of a wholly predictable revolution; but when it came, contrary to the usual pattern of revolutions, it was bloodless. As its leaders stated repeatedly, they wanted reforms in Egypt; they did not seek revenge. King Farouk was forced to abdicate in favor of his infant son; but the king was exiled, not executed.<sup>1</sup> The earliest measures of a 12-man "Revolution Command Council" were aimed at replacing a corrupt administration by honest government and substituting "social and economic justice" for the monopoly of wealth and the traditional abuses of the landlords—the greatest of whom were the members of the royal family. The government of the Revolution sought to raise the general standard of living and to reduce the poverty and disease endured, so long and so apathetically, by the vast peasant majority.

The Free Officers were plunged into the task of governing before they had time to work out the details of a reform program; they came to power with ideals, but with no ideology. Consequently the *ad hoc* policies, which developed as their planning was expanded, were flexible and remained responsive to sudden needs and changing situations.

<sup>1</sup> The coup d'état which inaugurated the Revolution took place on July 23, 1952. Within 6 months, supporters of the ex-king, who were believed to have been guilty of crimes against Egyptians, were tried and many of them were given prison sentences. A few of them received death sentences which were subsequently commuted.

<sup>2</sup> See Doreen Warriner, *Land Reform and Development in the Middle East: A Study of Egypt, Syria and Iraq* (2d ed., rev.; London: Oxford University Press, 1962), Chapter I and "Postscript." See also Charles Issawi, *Egypt in Revolution: An Economic Analysis* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).

<sup>3</sup> The treasury had been empty when the government of the Revolution took over the administration of Egypt; a budgetary deficit of about \$115 million was inherited.

## AGRARIAN REFORM

Immediately after the Revolution, the *Agrarian Reform Law* was enacted. Individual landholdings were limited to 200 acres; a family with two sons could retain 300 acres (300 acres then yielded a net annual income of from \$15,000 to \$18,000). The systematic reduction of rents was provided for, as was the raising of agricultural wages. Integrated cooperatives for producing and marketing were also organized, and made mandatory for villages receiving redistributed land. Only the properties of the king and royal family were confiscated—all other privately owned land was expropriated for adequate compensation.<sup>2</sup>

The land law was bitterly criticized by both Egyptian Conservatives (as being too drastic) and Socialists (for not being drastic enough), despite the fact that this act was the first blow struck by an Arab government on behalf of the peasantry, and against feudalism. Both protests missed the basic purpose. The law was intended in part as a humanitarian measure; but its fundamental objective was to break the power of the old ruling oligarchy, long rooted in landed estates. Landlords who had a vested interest in the status quo were unprogressive and reactionary. The land law was a political measure, which proved to be revolutionary in its effects. The existing concentration of landed wealth was abolished and, socially speaking, the centuries-old yoke of feudalism in Egypt was broken. All titles were abolished.

Early in the Revolution, a rigid austerity program was instituted; the national budget was actually balanced by the end of the first revolutionary year.<sup>3</sup>

Egypt's key development project is the high dam just above the first dam at Aswan. The fertile valley of the Nile holds the world's land productivity record; nevertheless, its productivity has to be increased markedly, in view of the country's population explosion. The only way to increase the already highly developed system of irrigation is to expand water-storage capacity and make full use of the excess flood waters of the Nile. Experts agree that the high dam project is a matter

of life or death for the Egyptian economy. The plan provides for the permanent storage of vast reserves of Nile water, the prevention of devastating floods, the addition of two million acres of perennially cultivable land, and great new sources of hydroelectric power for industry. The United States, the United Kingdom and the World Bank made a formal tripartite offer to Nasser's government in December, 1955, to aid in the building of the high dam. The offer was frankly made to counteract undue Soviet influence after the conclusion of the Egyptian-Czech arms deal. The American withdrawal of the offer for unadmitted political reasons in July, 1956, caused President Gamal Abdel Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal Company—thereby precipitating the Suez crisis which led to war. Two and a half years after the Western offer had been withdrawn, the Soviet Union made an offer of its own to participate in building the high dam. This great dam is now in the process of building, and the first construction stage ended in May, 1964.

Before 1956, there had been several domestic hindrances to the work of the revolutionary government. Directly after the passing of the Agrarian Reform Law the political parties had opposed the Revolution; they were summarily repressed. Gradualists, fearful of going forward too rapidly, had been shunted aside. General Mohammed Naguib, first chief-of-state, was one of them; he was forced to retire in 1954, and Nasser subsequently assumed full power. Communists made trouble consistently and were jailed year after year—even after work on the high dam was finally initiated with Soviet aid. Egypt's revolutionary government, though friendly with communist regimes, has explicitly repudiated communism and communist atheism and materialism. The Muslim Brotherhood, a powerful fundamentalist po-

litico-religious organization, was the most formidable opponent of the Revolution. This organization opposed the establishment of a secular republic; its goal was a theocratic state, based completely upon the Sacred Law of Islam as established in the seventh century by the Prophet Muhammad. The Muslim Brothers became subversive and they were accordingly repressed late in 1954. Unhappily for Egypt, the Brotherhood surfaced in the summer of 1965 and attempted, once again, to assassinate President Gamal Abdel Nasser—but again, at least temporarily, they have been suppressed and four of their leaders executed for treason.

After the war over Suez in 1956 and a complex of later international crises, the revolutionary government was able to return to its domestic reform program. The National Charter of May, 1962—which incorporated legislation passed the previous July—continued and expanded, but did not alter, the basic principles of the Revolution and the republican constitution of January, 1956.<sup>4</sup> Able civilians continued to advise the government and aid in the work of reconstruction. After the Suez War, President Nasser's government began to formulate a genuine ideology: first in international relations, through its neutralist policies; later, in 1961, in its domestic policy for Arab socialism. The one important innovation has been the principle of nationalization. At first undertaken for nationalist-political reasons, both during and after the Suez crisis, nationalization has now become basic to the "scientific" planning.

The Charter of 1962 illustrates how far the government of the Revolution has gone since 1954 towards implementing a program of socialism in Egypt. A policy of selective nationalization, aimed at the abolition of exploitation and of large-scale private monopolies, has brought the banks, insurance companies, foreign trade, public utilities and all major heavy industries under government control. Egypt's transportation services have always been government-controlled. At the same time, the right to own private property has been explicitly guaranteed;<sup>5</sup> and participation of private capital and enterprise in

<sup>4</sup> There are English texts, published in Cairo, of the National Charter of May, 1962, and of the constitution of January, 1956. The National Charter was approved by a national congress convened in Cairo in June, 1962.

<sup>5</sup> Egypt is a Muslim country. The *Koran* and the *Shari'a* (the Sacred Law of Islam) contain detailed provisions concerning property rights and the laws of inheritance.

about 25 per cent of the export trade, and in 75 per cent of the internal trade is stipulated. The stated objective is close collaboration between the public and the private sectors for the greater good of Egypt. The place in society of democratic farmers' cooperatives and of industrial and agricultural labor unions is strongly emphasized.

The cooperative societies, stressed by the Charter, have demonstrated their value. Comparisons between the prereform and the "supervised cooperatives" have shown that the yield of cotton per acre has risen 45 per cent since the Revolution. The cooperatives "combine both collective and cooperative elements" in a genuinely "original pattern," according to a noted Western economist.<sup>6</sup> In a few of them, a sense of community responsibility has grown so markedly that official supervision has been withdrawn.

The Agrarian Reform of 1952 proved to be an economic success, and the administrative machinery developed for the redistribution of expropriated land was highly efficient. But not enough was accomplished. Only a million peasants had received land (between 3 and 5 acres each) by 1961. Consequently, a new land law further limited individual land-holdings to 100 acres, and purchase payments for land distributed among small farmers benefiting from the agrarian reform laws was reduced by three-fourths.

In recent years there has been a high rate of industrialization. By the spring of 1961, it was officially reported that Egypt's industrial production had surpassed its agricultural production for the first time in Egyptian history. The Suez Canal has been broadened and deepened since the old Canal Company was nationalized in 1956; the service to ships in transit has improved under Egypt's Canal Authority; canal traffic has reached a record peak and Egypt is gaining far more from canal dues now than under the old regime.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> See Warriner, *op. cit.*, pp. 202-203, for information on the supervised cooperatives of the agrarian reform of the Revolution.

<sup>7</sup> *The Economist* (London), April 2, 1966, pp. 63-66. "In spite of critics who predicted its collapse, traffic has risen from 14,466 ships in 1955 to a record 19,150 ships last year [1965]" (p. 63).

## PREPARATION FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT

Establishment of a national assembly in 1964 was heralded by the charter of May, 1962, which embodied revolutionary principles based upon ten years of practical experience; and it was preceded by two years of intensive preparation for self-government. A system of local administration, tending toward decentralization, provided political education and training at the grass roots level. Popular councils were organized and the Arab Socialist Union was created to mobilize and organize the masses behind the projected new system of national government.

The draft constitution of March, 1964, proclaimed the United Arab Republic to be a "socialist democratic state"; it embodied most of the principles of the 1956 constitution and the Charter of 1962, and it stipulated "that the Egyptian people are part of the Arab nation." The draft constitution emphasized that the central government ("the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, his deputies and the ministers") should take responsibility for national policy planning and for the implementation of its plans, because "the socialist solution of the problem of economic and social backwardness cannot be reached except through an overall planning of the process of production." Deputies to the national assembly were granted the normal immunities and the independence of the judiciary was guaranteed. Freedom of religious belief, of speech, of the press, and the right of assembly were confirmed; and the "right" of every citizen to work, to health and social care, and to education was stipulated. Industrial workers are expected to participate in management and share to a small degree (about 25 per cent) in the profits of production. They are also to be guaranteed a minimum wage. Men and women are to have equal rights and opportunities, including the right to vote.

By the spring of 1964, the Egyptian people were deemed ready to participate in a genuinely representative system of government. A national assembly was convened in March, 1964, for a five-year term. Only ten deputies were appointed; 350 of its 360 members were



"elected by general secret ballot."<sup>8</sup> The deputies were representatives of "the alliance of the working popular powers," that is to say, they were laborers, farmers, soldiers, intellectuals (drawn from the universities as well as from elite professional groups) and industrialists. At least 50 per cent of the national assembly members were peasants and laborers. This assembly set to work to write a permanent constitution based upon principles established in the draft constitution which had brought it into existence. Early in 1965 it unanimously nominated Gamal Abdel Nasser to succeed himself as president of the republic. In March, 1965, he was reelected to a six-year term in a national plebiscite.

### FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The broad goals of the revolutionary government in foreign affairs include peace, international disarmament, the international prohibition of nuclear testing, international cooperation in scientific advances and a strong recommitment to the United Nations. Egypt became a member of the Disarmament Committee formed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1960 and signed the treaty for the suspension and partial banning of nuclear tests in August, 1963. Egyptian delegates have served in all the principal councils, committees, and agencies of the United Nations.

At the same time, Egypt continues to resist economic as well as political imperialism. Because of the triple invasion of their country in the Suez war of 1956, Egyptians are still highly sensitive to this receding Western phenomenon. Moreover, in view of (1) the forcible establishment of Israel in Palestine in 1948, and (2) the present grave plight of Palestine's Arab refugees,<sup>9</sup> who now number over 1,300,000, as well as (3) the participa-

tion of Israel in the Suez invasion of Egypt in 1956, the government of Egypt considers that Israel, supported by the Western powers, represents a dangerous stronghold of imperialism in the Arab Middle East.

### ARAB NATIONALISM

In its policy toward the Arab world Egypt has, since the Revolution, consistently and firmly supported Arab nationalism and has assumed leadership of the developing social revolution in the Arab world. With respect to Egypt's Arab policy one must bear in mind the general goals of what Westerners call the Arab Nationalist Movement, or the Arab "awakening"—a movement which in fact constitutes a total Arab renaissance on social, economic and political levels.

One must also consider the special position of Egypt in the Arab world. Until the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, Egypt constituted a land-bridge between the Arabs of Asia and those of North Africa. The language of Egyptians has been Arabic since the incorporation of Egypt in the Arab Islamic Empire of the seventh century, and Egyptians today share the cultural heritage and the rich literature of all Arabs. By the late 1930's, the Arab National Movement was already seeking three major goals: (1) Unqualified political independence—not only in name but in fact freed from the hampering controls of any special treaty relationships with a great power; (2) Arab unity, by which was meant a reunification of all the Arab peoples—first and foremost in the Arab heartland; and (3) Social and economic betterment—reforms that would reach all elements of the Arab peoples.

From the time of the constitution of January, 1956, which proclaimed for the first time that Egyptians were "an Arab people" and part of a wider Arab "nation," Egyptians gradually assumed leadership in the developing movement for Arab unity, and they did so naturally because their successful and bloodless revolution became a symbol of hope to the Arab masses, an example of what could be accomplished by a determined people. When Egyptians fought against the three invading armies of Israel, France and Great

<sup>8</sup> See *The United Arab Republic 1965, The Year Book* (Cairo: U.A.R. Information Office), pp. 21-42, for information on the new system of government in the U.A.R.

<sup>9</sup> The latest *Report* of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (U.N.R.W.A.) for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, dated June 30, 1966, gives the figure 1,317,749. See p. 4. of Supplement No. 13 (A/6313), U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, New York, 1966.

Britain in the Suez war of 1956, and when President Nasser turned a military defeat into a diplomatic triumph, the Egyptian president himself inevitably became the hero of the articulate masses in neighboring Arab countries.

### "POSITIVE NEUTRALISM"

Neutralism is implicit in the goals of the Arab National Movement. Egypt's adaption of an uncompromising policy of neutralism became identifiable in October, 1951, when the government of King Farouk unilaterally repudiated its formal treaty relationship with Britain and simultaneously refused to join the Middle East Defense Organization then proposed by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Turkey. The whole idea of the containment of the U.S.S.R. by an encircling system of defensive alliances looked dangerous to the Egyptians. In case of war, if any Arab state were to be involved on either the winning or the losing side, the Arab world would once again become a battleground—for the third time in the twentieth century. After the Revolution, Abdel Nasser feared that the cold war might easily erupt into a hot war in the Middle East. When, therefore, the royal government of Iraq was persuaded to join the Western-sponsored Baghdad Pact in 1955 (the only Arab government to do so) Nasser's anger with the Baghdad government as well as with the Western powers knew no bounds. In Nasser's view, Iraq (in alliance with Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Britain) had brought the cold war into the Middle East, had thereby endangered every other nonaligned Arab state, and had undermined the movement for Arab unity. The Baghdad Pact split the Arab world into two cold war camps until the Iraqi revolution of July, 1958, after which Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact.

Egypt's "positive neutralism" is predicated upon the following assumptions: (1) The only security for an Arab country in the cold

war between the Soviet Union and the West is to remain outside of that conflict; (2) The best defense for each and every Arab state is solidarity based upon an Arab collective defense system; (3) Arab solidarity, coupled with a policy of noninvolvement in the cold war, will present any Arab state from tying itself to a great power—or to any non-Arab power in either camp—that could bring war directly into the Arab world; (4) Alignment with any great power requires that an Arab-aligned state would be tied to great power decisions and would, therefore, have no voice in decisions that might affect the security of the whole Arab world. For these reasons an unyielding policy of nonalignment should be adopted by every Arab government.<sup>10</sup>

In April, 1955, the Bandung Conference was held in Indonesia. There, Nasser, who headed the Egyptian delegation, earned a reputation for astute diplomatic negotiation. He took strong neutralist convictions with him to Bandung and when he returned to Egypt he brought back a conviction that neutralist principles, staunchly underwritten by many Afro-Asian states, would in time form the basis for effective policy in the United Nations. The Bandung consensus, in Nasser's view, had produced a practical policy to minimize the risks of a world war. After Bandung, a new element was added to Egyptian neutralism. As a nonparticipant in the cold war, the United Arab Republic has sought to mediate between the two power blocs in order to bring about a lessening of world tensions. Several Egyptian attempts at mediation have emphasized the "positive" aspect of neutralism.

The year 1955 set in train a series of other important international developments. On February 28, with its first military "raid" on the Gaza Strip, Israel inaugurated a policy of active hostility against Egypt. This policy culminated in the Israeli invasion of Sinai at the beginning of the Suez War. Israeli aggressions in 1955, which included forcible occupation of the strategic Demilitarized Zone of El-Auja (giving access to all routes crossing Sinai), were censured by the United Nations Security Council and led Egypt to

<sup>10</sup> For an illuminating discussion of the meaning of Arab neutralism and nonalignment by Arabs, see: FAYEZ A. SAYEGH (ed.), *The Dynamics of Neutralism in the Arab World: A Symposium* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1965).

obtain heavy arms to match the jet fighters and tanks which France was then supplying to Israel. When Egyptian appeals to the United States and Britain were refused, Egypt sought and obtained arms from Czechoslovakia—in the “Czech arms deal” of September, 1955.

Concurrently, a new movement for closer Arab collaboration was launched outside the framework of the Arab League.<sup>11</sup> Concrete steps were taken between 1955 and 1957 to unify the economies of Egypt and Syria; mutual security pacts were concluded by Egypt, first with Syria, then with Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and eventually between Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in 1956. An Arab Cultural Unity Agreement was signed the following year. A federal union between Syria and Egypt was planned late in 1957. Actually, the two states formed a unitary government instead and established the United Arab Republic in February, 1958. But this union, entered into against President Nasser's considered judgment, was formed too precipitately, at the urgent request of the Syrian government, to save it from the imminent danger of a communist coup in Damascus. The United Arab Republic was disrupted by the secession of Syria in September, 1961.<sup>12</sup> Today a new rapprochement is taking place between Egypt and Syria, and the revolutionary government of Iraq is seeking political and cultural union with Egypt, this time on the basis of federation. An Iraqi-Egyptian Unity Agreement, signed in 1964, was reaffirmed in February, 1966—before the untimely death of President Abdel Salem Arif of Iraq six weeks later. The impulse for unity is strong, but the liabilities of unification, even on a federal basis, are formidable. Political instability in Syria and Iraq, coupled with the economic and population disparities between Egypt and these two

“fertile crescent” countries, pose major difficulties.

## CONCLUSION

Egypt today faces serious demographic and economic problems. Its exploding population still lives upon an inadequate agricultural base; urbanization is increasing rapidly; consumer demands are expanding; there is an acute shortage of foreign exchange and an adverse balance of payments. The principal export crop, cotton, was heavily mortgaged to communist countries in return for the arms needed to protect Egypt against Israel. Furthermore, Egyptian financial problems have been unduly aggravated by according military and economic aid to the new republican government of Yemen in its civil war against the Saudi-supported followers of the old Imamate.

On the other hand, a number of favorable factors exist which, to this writer's mind, will in the long run offset most of Egypt's acute problems. The government of the Revolution has, for over 14 years, successfully withstood both domestic and foreign challenges. The revolutionary leadership is wholly committed to progress. President Nasser, who is respected for his courage and for his astute handling of international crises, is supported in the government by other able Egyptians equally committed to carrying on the Revolutionary program for economic and industrial development.

Major land reclamation projects, initiated

(Continued on page 114)

<sup>11</sup> See Fayez A. Sayegh, *Arab Unity: Hope and Fulfillment* (New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1958).

<sup>12</sup> Contrary to many Western press reports at the time, the initiative for immediate and close union, on the basis of a unitary government, was taken by the government of Syria and by the Syrian president in person. After the secession of Syria (1961), the government of Egypt continued to retain the name of the United Arab Republic.

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*The resumption of the inter-Arab cold war, in the opinion of this specialist, "was inevitable . . . because of the inherent dichotomy between the revolutionary and the conservative camps in the Arab world. Nasser and his spiritual allies . . . represent a new radical philosophy . . . which is unacceptable to the gradualist evolutionary approach of Faisal."*

# Tradition and Reform in Saudi Arabia

By GEORGE LENCZOWSKI

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SAUDI ARABIA is one of the few surviving desert-patriarchal kingdoms whose political and social system still rests on traditional principles and practices. Legitimacy of the ruling House of Saud is based on a combination of tribal-dynastic and religious factors. The state is an absolute monarchy not bound by any written secular fundamental law. However, absolutism is tempered by at least three elements: (a) the paramountcy of the sacred law of Islam (*shari'a*) whose main exponents are the religious jurists (*'ulama*) of the puritan Wahhabi sect; (b) the need to cultivate the tribes whose loyalty is necessary as a counterweight against certain disruptive forces; (c) the principle of consultation which, though highly informal in its operation, represents a restraining influence on any possible arbitrariness.

The essentially theocratic (or divine nomic) character of the Saudi kingdom is expressed by the supreme role of religion in the concepts and practices of the state. The Koran and the Traditions (*sunna*) provide the basic socio-legal framework within which all legislation and administration is expected to operate. The only courts are the *shari'a* courts presided over by the religious judges (*qadis*) even to the point of enforcing traffic regulations. The Koran-based Islamic legal principles—such as inequality of testimony of men and women, and of Muslims and unbe-

lievers; blood money (*diya*) for homicide; amputation of the right hand as punishment for theft, and so forth—are still vigorously applied. The legal opinion (*fatwa*) of the body of *'ulama* is still sought in cases of doubt as to the major legal enactments of the state or in cases of "constitutional" policy decisions such as the deposition of the ruler and his replacement. A semi-public organization called the committees of public morality (*muta-wiyyin*), receiving instructions from the Grand Mufti of the Kingdom, plays the role of a watchdog over public and, occasionally, private conformity of the citizens with the rules of Islam, such as observing the ban on alcohol consumption, or daily ritual prayers. These committees are subsidized by the state's treasury.

In harmony with the strict Wahhabi doctrine, a ban is imposed on certain forms of entertainment (such as movies; no movie theater exists in the kingdom except in the oil company or embassy compounds). And last but not least, the official aim of public schools is to educate the citizens in the spirit of Islam.

The ruling institution of the country may be described as resting on four pillars: the king, the military establishment, the *'ulama*, and the bureaucracy. The military establishment is divided into separate, mutually independent segments. In addition to the



regular army (together with a small air force and a rather symbolic navy), there is also the so-called white army, a tribal force (*mujaheddin*) which is invariably commanded by one of the royal sons or brothers and which presents, in numbers and in spirit (if not in equipment) a potential counterweight to the regular army. The third segment is the royal guards (*haras al-maliki*) attached to the person of the ruler, a force now undergoing a reorganization which may possibly result in its dissolution. Of the role of the *'ulama* we have already spoken. As for bureaucracy, it has grown in the last 15 years to sizeable proportions. Comprising as it does today most of the formally educated men in the kingdom, the bureaucracy follows the rational Western forms of organization and exerts a steadily increasing influence on the formulation of the policies of the state.

## CHANGE

While the traditional features of the Saudi polity are strong and ubiquitous, the system is not static. In fact, during the past 15-odd years it has been undergoing a variety of changes in the general direction of modernization. These changes could be described as both spontaneous and deliberate. The spontaneous changes have been primarily due to the exposure of the Saudi Arabian society to the outside world. Among the major influences, one should list first of all the presence in Arabia of Western oil enterprise personified by the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco). Employing at one time or another up to 5,000 Americans and over 15,000 Saudis, the company acquainted large numbers of the population with Western techniques of organization, technology and business methods. Thousands of Saudis thus graduated from the company's industrial training programs with a variety of useful skills. To encourage the spirit of self-reliance and technical progress, the company set up a special Industrial Development Division whose task was to advise and assist (up to the point of detailed blueprinting) prospective Saudi entrepreneurs in establishing their own business enterprises.

The steadily increasing flow of money from the oil operations to the state treasury (about \$600 million in 1966) has acted as a stimulant to a variety of public and private activities which invariably enlarged the area of exposure to Western influences. The Saudis began to travel by the thousands abroad, to acquire a variety of appliances and gadgets for their homes, and appreciate certain forms of entertainment (recorded music, motion pictures) still officially banned in the kingdom. While in 1953, the country had only two newspapers, the official *Umm al-Qura* and *Al-Madinah al-Munawwarah*, in 1966 it had about a dozen of daily and periodical publications printed in Jidda, Mecca, Riyadh and the Eastern Province. An ever larger number of people, including the most humble strata, became possessors of radio and transistor sets, enabling them to receive the flow of news and propaganda emanating from other Arab capitals.

With an eye to the long-range impact, the most important manifestation of the oil-spurred affluence has been the capacity to send growing numbers of young Saudis for higher studies abroad, especially to the United States.

These spontaneous expressions of change have been supplemented by deliberate government-sponsored policies aiming at modernization. In terms of classification, it is not easy to impress these policies into any neat category. Historically, deliberate national modernization policies could roughly fall into two categories: the first, whose main objective was the techno-administrative and military strengthening of the state (such as the policies of Mohammed Ali in Egypt, Selim III and Mahmoud II in Turkey), and the second, which aimed at broader and deeper socio-political progress (such as the policies of the Young Turks, or the Persian constitutionalists).

As for the Saudi modernization process, we may tentatively look upon it as primarily fitting into the first category but with some activities belonging to the second. This is so because reforms have been launched within the existing framework of political and re-

ligious legitimacy; no questions were encouraged regarding the fundamentals of this framework. Yet the very impact of government-sponsored education and participation in inter-Arab and international conferences and activities have been bound to stimulate thinking on basic social and political issues. This thinking and the mental comparisons drawn between the state of affairs in Arabia and that prevailing in the more advanced countries has inevitably led to the questioning of the foundations of the Saudi polity and, in a more positive sense, to expectations and demands for reform transcending mere administrative order and efficiency.

Among the most notable measures of modernization one should mention the establishment of a formal structure of the Council of Ministers, of the Saudi Arab Monetary Agency (central bank), of the Development Board, and of the King Saud University in Riyadh. Also noteworthy was the creation of the Petroleum and Minerals Authority (Petromin), an autonomous agency aiming at the development of the subterranean resources of the kingdom, the building of primary and secondary schools (including the girls' schools) and teachers' colleges, hospitals, and clinics. Regular state budgets were first introduced in 1952-1953, thus separating the state treasury from the king's privy purse. Fairly general (to the point of vagueness) in early years, these budgets have become more detailed with the passage of time, with a corresponding increase in the amounts allocated to education and development purposes. In the mid-1960's, the government took a bold step in establishing a state-owned television station over the implicit opposition of religious circles. It may prove to have a major impact on the emancipation of Saudi masses from traditional patterns.

A number of these reforms were begun during the reign of King Saud (1953-1964). Except for a period of 22 months (January, 1961-October, 1962), Crown Prince Faisal served as prime minister during his brother's reign. Of the two royal brothers, Faisal was more progressive in his outlook and was endowed with superior intelligence and strength

of character. Symbolic of this contrast was the fact that whereas Saud educated all his sons—numbering close to 30—in a special Royal Sons School in the palace compound in Riyadh (whose standards and curriculum remained a mystery to the outside world), Faisal made a point of sending eight of his nine sons to secondary schools and colleges in the United States.

In 1961-1962, King Saud made an attempt to reserve the whole power to himself. This attempt failed and in response to a strong clamor from many dissatisfied quarters at home, the King was obliged to reappoint Faisal as prime minister on October 17, 1962. His reappointment closely followed the outbreak of the revolution and civil war in Yemen. Before resuming his duties, Faisal (then undergoing medical treatment in the United States) held conversations with United States President John F. Kennedy to ascertain American policies toward the events in the Arabian Peninsula and whether, in particular, Saudi Arabia could count on United States support in case of a crisis that might threaten its security.

The outcome of these talks was a letter to Prince Faisal, dated October 25 (but released only on January 8, 1963), in which President Kennedy (a) welcomed the intention of Faisal's government to embark upon a course of energetic reform and development; and (b) in consideration of the above, pledged American support to "the maintenance of Saudi Arabia's integrity." The latter point had its internal and external implications. It signified Washington's willingness both to lend Faisal a helping hand in his reform program and to protect the kingdom from external aggression should the war in Yemen degenerate into an inter-Arab armed conflict.

Faisal's return to Saudi Arabia looked like a triumphal procession. Massive expressions of welcome from many quarters were genuine. The Saudi public looked eagerly toward his leadership after years of financial mismanagement, extravagance of the palace-pampered princes, and an inconsistent foreign policy which swayed from all-out support of Nasser and the Syrian leftists in 1955-1956 to a sus-

pected embroilment in an assassination plot against the Egyptian president in 1958.

### THE TEN-POINT REFORM PROGRAM

Encouraged by domestic and American support, on November 6, 1962, Faisal issued a ten-point program of reform which could be summed up as follows:

1. While reconfirming the state's adherence to Islamic law, it promised to issue a basic law (a constitution) and set up a consultative council.

2. It pledged enactment of provincial regulations that would establish local governments.

3. It proclaimed independence of the judiciary and promised to establish a supreme judicial council and a ministry of justice.

4. It announced that the above-mentioned judicial council would be composed of 20 members chosen from both the lay jurists and the *'ulama*.

5. It promised to strengthen Islamic propaganda.

6. It proclaimed the reform of the committees of public morality.

7. It proclaimed the government's solicitude for social matters and education and pledged control of retail prices, establishment of scholarships for students, social security regulations, a law protecting laborers from unemployment, and provision of innocent means of recreation for all citizens.

8. It announced the intention to regulate economic and commercial activities through appropriate legislation which would assure progress, economic expansion, and encouragement of capital investment.

9. It pledged sustained endeavor to develop the country's resources and economy, in particular, roads, water resources, heavy and light industry, self-sufficient agriculture.

10. It abolished slavery in the kingdom.

The program in question signified a major advance conceptually and in practice. While carefully reaffirming the state's devotion to the basic principles of Islam, it introduced important innovations, foremost among which stood the pledge to issue a basic law (together with the consultative assembly) and to set

up a semi-secular judicial council which would put an end to religious monopoly of the administration of justice. Second in importance was the pledge to reform (i.e., to curb) the ubiquitous committees of public morality, coupled with a promise to provide "innocent means of recreation" for the masses, thus foreshadowing the abandonment of the irksome official ban on the much-demanded movies, music and television.

On the pragmatic side—i.e., in the sectors where there was no incompatibility with the traditional practices of Islam—Faisal's pledge to concentrate on problems of social and economic development was welcomed as a portent of a more consistent and determined policy to utilize the growing income of the state for constructive tasks which would result in increased prosperity and greater social justice.

How did the program of reform fare? It appears that more progress was achieved in the "pragmatic" than in the "conceptual" sector. With impressive speed, Faisal brought order into the disorganized Saudi finances, paid off all state debts, stabilized the currency, and balanced the annual budgets, while setting aside special funds for development. Development itself began emerging from the stage of planning into the stage of execution. Numerous foreign firms were engaged to carry out more complex engineering tasks. An ambitious road-building program was launched and serious efforts were exerted toward the establishment of a water desalinization plant in Jidda. New airports were built and the Saudi Arabian Airlines were modernized and entrusted to a management benefiting from expert foreign advice.

The Petromin entered into contracts aiming at the development of petrochemical industries. A geophysical survey of the country was undertaken. A petroleum college was inaugurated in Dammam. Telephone service was expanded and modernized and other utilities were extended in the rapidly growing cities. Increasing numbers of government scholarships were given to young men for study abroad. All in all, not only government-sponsored projects, but also—with the

general restoration of confidence—private business experienced expansion up to the point of a veritable boom by 1966.

Somewhat in contrast, those points of the 1962 program that spoke of the basic law, the consultative assembly, and other modern institutions and regulations still (at the end of 1966) awaited fulfillment. The main reason for Faisal's reluctance to hasten their implementation was to be sought in the political sphere, partly domestic and largely foreign. In the domestic sector, Faisal's return to premiership—with an obvious new mandate from the people—brought forth the inevitable final showdown between him and the king. This came about in two successive steps: on March 28, 1964, King Saud was stripped of all powers by decision of the council of ministers backed by a *fatwa* and the resolution of the leading princes. These powers were transferred to Faisal. The king retained only nominal authority. In spite of this, he yielded to advice urging him to regain initiative and influence in public affairs, thus preventing Faisal from full enjoyment of his newly-acquired rights. Ultimately, on November 2, Saud was deposed by joint resolutions of the royal family, the council of ministers, and the *'ulama*. These same bodies proclaimed Faisal as king. Promptly afterward, numerous princes, tribal leaders, notables, and high government dignitaries began declaring obedience to the new sovereign.

## WAR IN YEMEN

Irritations caused by the two-year struggle for power produced inevitable delays in the execution of the ten-point program. But even a greater obstacle was encountered in the form of the repercussions of the civil war that had begun in 1962 in Yemen. Despite the speed with which the revolutionaries gained control of the major cities and the coastal plain, the new republican regime of Yemeni General Abdullah Sallal (September, 1962) found it difficult to control the rugged mountainous hinterland. There, fierce resistance came into being under the aegis of the deposed Imam Mohammed Badr, supported by loyal tribes. Within a few weeks,

Yemen's civil war brought about outside intervention. Responding to the call of the republicans, U.A.R.'s President Gamal Abdel Nasser dispatched his troops to bolster up the shaky new regime and help it in subduing the royalist resistance. By the same token, the Saudi government began extending aid in the form of money, supplies, and munitions to the royalists. Cairo's early hope for a swift military solution did not materialize. As the war dragged on, Egyptian troops grew in number until they reached an estimated 70,000 men. Moreover, irritated by the Saudi role in the royalist resistance, the U.A.R. government launched a series of military attacks (mostly by its air force) against the Saudi territory.

The bombing of Najran, a border town used as a base for Saudi supplies to the royalists, on December 30, 1962, by the U.A.R. planes brought about the rupture of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt as well as the reappearance of United States air force jets in Saudi Arabia, at the latter's request. Official Washington, however, sought to avoid a military confrontation with Nasser; instead it aimed at settling the conflict before it grew out of control. In line with this policy, the United States special envoy, Ellsworth Bunker, succeeded on April 13, 1963, in inducing the Saudi and U.A.R. governments to accept a nonintervention formula under the auspices of the United Nations. Subsequently a team of United Nations military observers began patrolling the Saudi-Yemeni border in June, 1963 (it terminated its task in September, 1964). Nonintervention meant that the Saudis pledged to stop supplying the royalists and the Egyptians promised to withdraw gradually from the Yemeni territory.

Observance of nonintervention was not perfect on either side: in fact, there was no indication of any serious reduction in the U.A.R. contingent in Yemen. Moreover, during this period a sizeable Egyptian drop of munitions and equipment was discovered in the northern Hejaz, deep within Saudi territory, giving rise to speculations as to the ultimate intentions of Egypt toward the Saudi government. It was in the midst of this



steadily deteriorating situation that the Arab summit meetings (initially called to consider the Jordan waters crisis with Israel) provided an opportunity for the Saudi and Egyptian heads of state to meet and discuss a possible solution of their conflict. After the second summit meeting (in Alexandria, September, 1964), Faisal—then still crown prince and premier—concluded an agreement with President Nasser, which pledged mutual nonintervention and intercession with the warring sides in Yemen to come to terms with each other. Subsequently, with Saudi and U.A.R. encouragement, the Yemeni republicans and royalists held a preliminary meeting in Erkowit (Sudan) where they agreed on a cease-fire and on the prompt calling of a more representative conference that would result in a decision as to the future form of government in Yemen.

#### THE JIDDA AGREEMENT

Postponed a number of times due to the difficulty of agreeing on the proper criteria of choosing the delegates of both parties, this conference was never held. Repeated violations of the cease-fire led to the desultory resumption of hostilities and, in the late summer of 1965, the Egyptians made a major military effort to break the backbone of the royalist resistance. Despite some territorial gains, their effort did not succeed. Soon afterwards, in a conciliatory gesture prior to the third summit meeting in Casablanca (scheduled for early September), President Nasser traveled to Jidda where, on August 24, 1965, he and Faisal—by then king—concluded a second agreement to settle the Yemen problem. More detailed than the preceding one, the Jidda agreement reinstituted the cease-fire (to be supervised by mixed Saudi-U.A.R. commissions), called for stoppage of Saudi aid to the royalists, and for the withdrawal of Egyptian troops within 13 months. It also provided for a national referendum on the form of government in Yemen to be held not later than November 23, 1966. This was to be preceded by a preliminary conference of 50 Yemeni representatives which would meet on November 23, 1965,

and elect a provisional government, the latter to govern the country until the referendum.

Such a conference convened in the northern Yemeni town of Harad on the stipulated date, but by early December it reached a deadlock over the issue of the future of the Yemeni royal Hamiduddin family. Consequently, it was adjourned *sine die*.

#### BASIC YEMEN ISSUES

The Yemen problem offered King Faisal a dilemma: he had to choose between the symbol represented by the monarchy in Yemen and the reality of U.A.R. troops, whose continued presence in Yemen posed a threat to Saudi security. Should he decide to abandon Yemen's royal family, he might thereby "purchase" the withdrawal of Egyptian troops. From the Saudi point of view, this would have been a distinct advantage. But adoption of such a policy would mean virtual capitulation to Egyptian demands, acknowledgement of the futility of the Saudi pro-royalist policy in Yemen, possible encouragement of antimonarchial movements anywhere in the Arabian Peninsula, and betrayal of the trust of the pro-royalist tribes.

Furthermore, Faisal had good reasons to suspect that even such a far-reaching concession on his part would not necessarily lead to Egyptian evacuation. This suspicion was based on the increasingly militant Egyptian behavior toward the Aden-based South Arabian Federation, from which the British had pledged to withdraw in 1968. Not only Faisal but many neutral observers tended to believe that President Nasser was anxious to maintain his military presence in Yemen at least until the favorable—from his point of view—solution of the situation in Aden. Furthermore, it became quite apparent during the four years of civil war that Yemen's republican regime was too weak to resist a determined royalist attack, if it were left to its own devices. Only massive Egyptian military support permitted it to wield power (virtually delegated by Cairo) in certain areas of Yemen. Thus even without the complicating factors of Aden and the Hamiduddin family, continued Egyptian presence might prove in-



dispensable to the survival of the republic. Nasser, no less than Faisal, had also to consider the symbolism of the situation.

The saving grace, insofar as Faisal was concerned, was the fact that it was possible to separate the general royalist cause from the Hamiduddin family as such. One could envisage a solution whereby some compromise agreement would be achieved between the mountain tribesmen and the lowland republicans without insisting on the continuity of the Hamiduddin dynasty. By 1966, there were indications that such a formula might be acceptable to King Faisal. Moreover, evidence was forthcoming that the majority of the Yemenis, even those in the republican camp, were becoming tired of the Egyptian military presence and that they would welcome an opportunity to restore peace to their embattled country without outside interference. In fact, at least one republican faction (sometimes referred to as the "third force") definitely was pressing for an early Egyptian withdrawal.

#### KUWAIT'S MEDIATION

Gradually less intransigent on the fate of the Hamiduddins but genuinely anxious to remove the Egyptians from Yemen, Faisal accepted without demurring the initiative of Kuwait in the spring and summer of 1966 to mediate in the conflict. The Kuwaiti formula called for the creation of a provisional Yemeni council in which the royalists (minus the Hamiduddin family) would hold two-fifths of the seats, the pro-Egyptian republicans another two-fifths, and the "independent" republicans one-fifth. Saudi nonintervention and a phased Egyptian evacuation were to be an integral part of the agreement. Neutral troops of other Arab states, nominated partly by Saudi Arabia and partly by Egypt, were gradually to replace the Egyptian contingent and supervise the implementation of the agreement.

While Faisal was reported favorably disposed toward this formula, Nasser's reaction was less enthusiastic, if not outright negative. He was reputedly displeased with the method of phasing the Egyptian withdrawal. Al-

though the U.A.R.-Saudi talks which were held in Kuwait were suspended late in August, the Kuwaiti government persisted in its further mediation efforts.

In the meantime, increasingly sceptical of Nasser's willingness to compromise, Faisal began seeking ways to strengthen the security of his country regardless of the outcome of the negotiations over Yemen. His policies could be described as following a three-pronged approach: (a) he launched the policy of Islamic solidarity as a counterweight to the socialist radicalism of the revolutionary Arab camp; this policy was inaugurated by his visit to the Shah of Iran in December, 1965, to be followed by mutual state visits with the rulers of such Islamic states as Pakistan, Turkey, Morocco and certain newer African countries; (b) he made determined moves to strengthen his kingdom's defenses; major contracts with British and American aviation and military equipment firms were concluded in December, 1965; they called for a radical modernization of the Saudi military establishment at a cost approximating \$600 million; and (c) he paid a state visit to United States President Lyndon Johnson in June, 1966, to coordinate Saudi and American policies and obtain reassurances of continued United States support for his country's independence, security, and territorial integrity. It is understood that, although no new formal agreements were signed, the king returned highly pleased with the outcome of his talks in Washington.

These policies of enhancing Saudi Arabia's security met with a barrage of criticism from Cairo. The powerful Egyptian propaganda apparatus renewed its presummit campaign against the Saudi monarchy, denouncing its Islamic policy as reactionary and its rap-

(Continued on page 115)

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George Lenczowski lived in the Middle East from 1938 to 1945 and has often revisited there since. His most recent books on the area include *Oil and State in the Middle East* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960) and *The Middle East in World Affairs* (3d ed.; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962).

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*Summing up Turkey's foreign policy, this author notes that: "... the shift ... away from the West discernible prior to the 1965 election continues, though Turkey's look to the north may be more cautious."*

## New Regime in Turkey

By RUTH C. LAWSON

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CHANGE HAS KEYNOTED Turkish political practices and policies during recent years. The general election of October 10, 1965, gave a clear majority in the national assembly to Suleyman Demirel's Justice Party, thus ending a series of coalition regimes which had governed Turkey since the 1961 restoration of constitutional government.

Has this new government checked or reversed the foreign policy trend of its immediate predecessors—a trend which many observers thought foreshadowed significant weakening of NATO's southern flank? For over a year prior to the election, Turkey had been assuming a more independent posture vis-a-vis the United States and asserting increasing interest in the U.S.S.R. Characterizing the preelection period were a series of diplomatic visits to and from Moscow and Ankara, the forging of closer economic ties with the Soviet Union, the display of conspicuous popular curiosity about the U.S.S.R., growing criticism of the United States by the press and intellectuals and some cooling of enthusiasm for the NATO alliance.

In November, 1964, Feridun Erkim paid the first visit to Moscow by a Turkish foreign minister since the early years of World War II. The following January, a Soviet parliamentary delegation visited Ankara. Its head

was Nikolai Podgorny, high member of the presidium of the Soviet Communist Party. Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko went to Turkey in May; later, Premier Suat Hayri Ürgüplü went to Moscow. His entourage included not only government officials but also influential newspaper editors.

The announcement by the Soviet ambassador to Turkey in March, 1965, that the U.S.S.R. was prepared to offer aid was followed almost immediately by the beginning of work on a joint irrigation project on the Anatolian-Georgian boundary. At the Izmir Fair in September, 1965, large crowds flocked to Russian exhibits which featured diverse machinery, industrial equipment, cameras, watches and precision instruments—all imaginatively displayed. Many Turks indicated a desire to visit the U.S.S.R. While acknowledging the lack of Russian interest in supplying military assistance, Turks maintained: "If we are friends of the Russians, we don't need military aid."

<sup>1</sup> This dependence was inaugurated by the 1947 Truman Doctrine and carried forward to enhance the effectiveness of guarantees of assistance under the North Atlantic Treaty (to which Turkey adhered in 1952).

For some, anti-Americanism was rooted not in economic and military dependence on the United States,<sup>1</sup> but rather in the belief that the United States should have offered more aid. The Turkish military has an almost inexhaustible appetite for new and modern weapons. However, the fact remains that Turkey has a military establishment of nearly one-half million men, the largest in the Middle East, much of it of very high quality.

It is also noteworthy that the United States

military assistance program in Turkey over the years has been by far the largest in any Middle East state. There have been important byproducts of the military buildup. The armed forces educational program has become a major weapon against illiteracy in a country where illiteracy is widespread. New roads, port facilities and electrical installations have notably strengthened the economy.

However, the Turks have not forgotten the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles—the only major United States missiles stationed in Turkey—shortly after the resolution of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Many relate the two events, although the United States has denied the relationship and has pointed out that the Jupiter is no longer a significant missile in the armory of the West. Furthermore, it is a moot point whether Turkey would still be disposed to favor the placing of foreign missiles on its territory.

Also a target of public criticism in Turkey was the delay in securing congressional authorization for the delivery of an overage destroyer promised by President Lyndon B. Johnson to former Premier Ismet Inonu in 1964. In dispute was the number—the Turkish government asserting that two had been promised. The affair became a national issue.

Other criticism of the United States stemmed from concern about the role of foreign corporations in the development of Turkish resources. The recent discovery of oil suggests that, given its location in relation to such other oil-producing areas as Iraq and Iran, Turkey may prove to have vast oil reserves. Are these to be exploited by foreign or by domestic interests? Growing opposition to United States companies, whose role in the Turkish economy has been spectacular, results in talk about *Étatism*, one of Kemal Atatürk's<sup>2</sup> principal plans for modernizing Turkey through the development of national wealth by state corporations. There is also mounting talk of socialization.

Not to be overestimated, but not to be overlooked either, was Turkish reconsideration in January, 1965, of its support for a United States-sponsored NATO nuclear armed multi-

national fleet. Having been one of the eight NATO members agreeing to work on the proposal, Turkey later withdrew from the negotiations on the ground that the project had become a divisive rather than a cohesive factor in the alliance.

### COOPERATION WITH THE WEST

Perspective on these developments requires emphasis on the fact that in the period preceding the 1965 elections there were no formal moves to alter Turkish participation in NATO or other Western-oriented groupings. Fourteen of Turkey's sixteen infantry divisions continued to be assigned to NATO. With few exceptions, the entire air force—900 aircraft and a complement of Nike-Ajax surface-to-air missiles—remained assigned to NATO. Turkish officers continued to participate in planning the defense of the NATO area and NATO's Eastern Mediterranean Command headquarters remained in Izmir.

Turkish membership in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) is the pivot which relates the defense of the other regional members, Iran and Pakistan, to NATO planning. CENTO headquarters are in Ankara. All United Kingdom military and economic aid—and some United States aid—to these three states is channeled through CENTO. On July 21, 1964, the three regional members launched an organization for economic and cultural collaboration, called Regional Cooperation for Development.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.) and the European Economic Community are also important to Turkey. As a Marshall Plan recipient, Turkey joined the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in 1948, and continued as a member of its successor, the O.E.C.D., created in 1960. On December 19, 1964, the Agreement of Association with the Common Market became effective, an arrangement devised not only to strengthen commercial and economic ties between the signatories but also to assist Turkish economic development.

Since 1950, Turkey has also been a member of the democratically-oriented Council of

<sup>2</sup> A founder of the Turkish republic.

Europe and is a signatory of the 1952 European Convention on Human Rights, perhaps the most important accomplishment of the Council.

## **RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA**

The range of these associations reflects Turkey's status as both a European and Asian power. Turkey is the European power which—in terms of land and water boundaries—has the most direct relationship to the Soviet Union. Its location astride the Dardanelles and Bosphorus has for centuries made it the target of Tzarist and Soviet ambitions to control the Straits as a warm water outlet. Since the late seventeenth century, Turkey and Russia have fought 13 wars, principally over the Straits. Traditional Turkish enmity for Russia has been reinforced by opposition to communist expansionism in the cold war period.

It should be recalled, however, that a commitment to the West and opposition to the U.S.S.R. has not consistently characterized the foreign policy of the Turkish republic. In early 1921, finding it difficult to win Western support, Ataturk sent Inonu to Moscow to confer with the new Bolshevik regime. The outcome was the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce signed on March 16, 1921. Four years later, on December 17, 1925, the two states concluded the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality, which was several times renewed; in 1933, they signed a commercial agreement. It should also be remembered that Turkey remained neutral in World War II, despite the Turkish-British-French treaty of alliance signed in 1939 with Soviet endorsement.

The historical record reveals that Turkish foreign policy is essentially pragmatic. Turkey has found accommodation with the Soviets possible when the Soviets are not openly expansionist. It was Stalin's March 19, 1945, denunciation of the 1925 treaty that played a part in turning Turkey into a staunch Western ally. It was Stalin who—at Potsdam in the summer of 1945—won United States and United Kingdom assent to seek revision of the 1936 Montreux Convention which had substituted Turkish sovereignty for international

control of the Straits. When the Soviets denounced the 1925 treaty, they not only asked for bases along the Straits and revision of this convention but also claimed territory in the Kars and Ardahan regions of East Turkey. Withdrawal of these territorial claims in 1953 and cessation of pressure for revision of the Straits convention inaugurated the Soviet wooing of Turkey.

## **PRESSURES FOR SHIFT**

Three additional reasons may also be suggested for the restlessness apparent in Turkish foreign policy in recent years. First, in an age characterized by intense nationalism, Turkey's more independent foreign policy may be considered an indication of political maturity.

Second, is the atmosphere of detente with the Soviet Union of several of Turkey's allies, despite certain continuing antagonisms. This has been marked by exchanges of visits between officials of the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom, France and West Germany, more flexible economic relations, and greater ease of travel to and from Eastern Europe. Moreover, the United States pressed for and concluded—principally with the U.S.S.R.—the 1963 nuclear test ban treaty, and a "hot line" was established between the Kremlin and the White House.

Finally, there can be no reasonable doubt that the rapprochement in Turco-Soviet relations was triggered by disappointment at United States failure to support Turkey in respect to the Cyprus crisis. This was initiated in November, 1963, by Cypriote President Makarios' proposals for amendment of certain articles of the 1960 Cyprus constitution—articles which had been a condition of independence. Designed to protect the interests of the minority Turkish Cypriote community vis-a-vis the Greek Cypriote majority, the 1960 constitution guaranteed the essential rights of the Turkish Cypriotes and assured them a government role exceeding their actual numerical strength. It came as no surprise when Makarios' proposals were rejected by the Turkish community and the Turkish government which, with the United Kingdom and Greece, had agreed as a condition of

Cypriote independence to guarantee the status quo defined in the constitution and in the three treaties accompanying independence.

Bitter fighting and terrorist activities in Cyprus were followed by withdrawal of some of the Turkish Cypriote ministers from participation in the government. Collective efforts to resolve the problem included the December, 1963, intervention of the Guarantor Powers as well as the February, 1964, proposal of the North Atlantic Council for a NATO force to maintain order. The former effort failed and the latter plan was rejected by President Makarios and abandoned after Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev warned that it would be regarded as a threat to world peace.

In March, 1964, a United Nations peace-keeping force has functioned on the island. However, President Makarios has either refused to take part in, or has rejected, all mediation efforts to date. His objectives—modification of the constitution and elimination of the restrictive treaties—are clear. The Turkish Cypriote community and the Turkish government fear that another objective is *enosis*, the union of Cyprus with Greece.

In the intense period of the Cypriote crisis, the United States was not inactive. While the facts of this diplomatic activity are known, much of the content of the exchanges remains secret. Well established, however, is United States President Johnson's pressure on Turkey when that government, after the failure of collective activities and pursuant to its right as a Guarantor Power, threatened unilateral intervention in Cyprus in June, 1964. He warned that such action would be inconsistent with Turkey's commitment to consult fully in advance with the United States and that it might lead to direct involvement by the Soviet Union. Under such circumstances, the President raised doubts as to the obligation of allies. Subsequently, both Premier Inonu and Greek Premier George Papandreou visited Washington at the invitation of President Johnson.

In respect to this energetic United States diplomacy, there is a tendency for Turks to

recall the acquiescence of their government to United States proposals which in some cases weakened the Turkish military posture vis-à-vis Cyprus, and the simultaneous failure of the United States to give public support to their position. Even those who appreciate the dilemma confronting the United States—namely, that Greece as well as Turkey is a NATO ally—argue that what they regard as Turkey's legally correct case merits endorsement. Not to be overlooked, moreover, is that the Soviets, despite an ambiguous record in the Cyprus affair, have somehow managed on certain occasions to convey to the Turks support for their position.

### RECENT ELECTIONS

Although some of the Turkish moves in the game of power politics have been targets of criticism at home, others have not. On the Cyprus issue, for example, Turkish opinion is united. Criticism of specific policies does not, moreover, have partisan roots. Foreign policy, consequently, was not at issue in the 1965 election campaign despite occasional charges of pro-Americanism leveled against Demirel because of his private association with a United States business firm after he lost his government post following the May 27, 1960, army coup.

Turkish politics have not generally been issue politics inasmuch as the two major parties, as in the United States, are coalitions of members holding a broad spectrum of views. In the 1965 election, however, something like an issue did emerge concerning the development of national resources. Inonu's advocacy of a "left of center" position suggested socialism to many and was criticized even within the leadership of his party, the Republican People's Party (R.P.P.). On this issue, the appeal of Demirel's advocacy of balanced development by both the public and private sectors overcame what many observers regarded as his major handicaps: namely, his lack of political experience until his emergence as leader of the Justice Party (J.P.) in November, 1964; and the fact that his party is heir to the Democratic Party (D.P.) of the late Premier Adnan Menderes. (The D.P.



held power from 1950 until it was deposed and outlawed by the 1960 army coup and its leaders condemned and executed.) The J.P. may be expected to be more conservative than the R.P.P. in light of the strong rural, Muslim, and rising middle class base of the former in contrast to the intellectual, secular, urban elite supporting the latter. The clear endorsement of the J.P. is evident in the 240 assembly seats it won with 52.8 per cent of the popular vote in comparison to the R.P.P.'s 134 seats with 28.7 per cent of the vote.

At the same time, a complex electoral method influenced by Belgian experience, combining proportional representation with a system of "national remainders," benefited the smaller parties by assuring them representation. Although the system (enacted by the R.P.P.-dominated coalition in January, 1965, in an attempt to weaken the Justice Party) failed in its purpose, Demirel came to power committed to the system's removal.

### ROLE OF THE MILITARY

These election results, bringing new and younger men to power, may properly be considered steps in the direction of political stability. Noteworthy was the "hands off" role of the military despite its continuing, if inconspicuous, political power. Whether or not it is the real power in the country, as some observers assert, is difficult to ascertain. It has provided both of Turkey's presidents since 1960. When it was necessary to replace President Cemal Gursel, former Chief of the General Staff Cevdet Sunay was elected for a seven-year term by the grand national assembly on March 28, 1966, with the concurrence of all the principal parties.<sup>3</sup>

The transformation of military rule into constitutional government under President Gursel reflected the conspicuously different political orientation of the Turkish military elite in contrast to that of military leaders in many new states. Highly educated and en-

joying close relations with intellectuals and civil servants, Turkish officers have been an important factor in the modernization and democratization of the country. From the inception of the republic, they have been a progressive force, regarding themselves as guardians of Ataturk's reforms and taking pride in their continuance.

### NEW TIES WITH THE EAST

The influence of older officers may be significant in setting limits to the rapprochement with the Soviet Union which has continued under the Demirel government. Negotiations launched before the election culminated in the November 12, 1965, initialing of an agreement in which the Soviets committed themselves to \$200 million in assistance for seven development projects over the next few years. Included in the program is an oil refinery, an iron and steel complex and an aluminum plant. The fact that agricultural exports will pay for the projects suggests that limits on Soviet aid to Turkey may also be set by the capacity of the Russians to consume tobacco and hazelnuts. On signing the protocol, Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil indicated that Soviet offers of aid would be welcomed when they were competitive with offers from the West, a statement suggesting a somewhat more guarded attitude towards the U.S.S.R. than that manifested by preceding governments. On February 18, 1966, a protocol for doubling the volume of trade was signed by the two states. Exchanges of visits with the Soviet Union have been accompanied by exchanges with other East European states, and new agreements have been concluded with several of them.

It would be a serious omission to fail to point out that Turkish leaders are aware of the danger of aggression when a small state lives in the shadow of a major power and also that national independence may be undermined by subversion. Responsible political figures appear to have few illusions about the course they are following. Only time will tell, however, whether centuries of experience with the Russians have taught the Turks how to meet new expansion maneuvers.

<sup>3</sup> A Turkish medical board had certified General Gursel—Turkey's first president after the 1960 revolution—as completely incapacitated and without possibility of recovery. He subsequently died on September 14, 1966, in Ankara.

Not to be underestimated in this context is the rapid growth since 1960 of a strident extreme left minority that is anti-American, socialist and neutralist, a program appealing to some university professors and students, civil servants and junior officers. Now operating in the parliamentary process through the Turkish Labor Party, the extreme left includes militants who support forceful revolutionary action of the type attempted by leftist junior officers in the unsuccessful coups of February 22, 1962, and May 21, 1963.

### MILITARY SECURITY & THE WEST

Circumspection has also characterized the relations of the Demirel government with the West. The premier pledged loyalty to the defensive alliances in his November 3, 1965, presentation of the government's program to the national assembly. Conspicuous implementation of this pledge was Turkey's participation with the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany and Italy in 1966 efforts to associate nonnuclear allies more effectively in NATO nuclear planning. A recommendation for the creation of a permanent seven-member nuclear planning group was approved by the December ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, and Turkey was named one of the three rotating members.

Simultaneously, in response to opposition contention that United States air bases impaired Turkish sovereignty and that reconnaissance flights therefrom endangered Turkish security, the government in April, 1966, prohibited the use of these bases for "spy flights" of the U-2 type. This may be less damaging than appears, however, as satellite reconnaissance can now replace manned flights. A review of the complex of postwar military and political agreements between the two states, including the Status of Forces Agreement, is under way. Revision of this would assign a greater role to Turkish courts in cases involving United States military personnel. Pressure for increased United States military assistance continues, however.

Noteworthy is the acceleration of West Germany's military assistance to Turkey, cur-

rently reported as approximately two-thirds that of the United States. At the same time, Germany is buying certain types of Turkish arms and ammunition. In August, 1966, the then German foreign minister, Gerhard Schröder, visited Ankara for discussion not only of the very considerable German aid program but also of Turco-German cultural relations. Exchanges of visits with other Western leaders are no less meaningful.

Other Western aid programs in Turkey continue and expand. Some are multilateral, e.g., that of the consortium embracing 14 O.E.C.D. members plus the World and European Investment Banks. During 1966, the World Bank and its affiliates, the International Development Association and the International Finance Corporation, gave new evidence of confidence in the government's development program by making available funds for use by private Turkish financial enterprises and corporations. Increasing industrial production, a drive for tourists, improvement in exports, an increase in state revenues and in the gross national product and the checking of inflation are some of the recent accomplishments. A foreign trade deficit remains, however, and severe earthquakes in eastern Turkey in August, 1966, were blows to the economy.

The second five-year plan (since 1960) is nevertheless expected to be presented to the national assembly in March, 1967. Of special interest—in view of the approximate doubling of the population since 1935—is the 1966 granting of a United States loan of \$3.6 million to assist family planning, the first United States development loan to support crucially-needed world population control.

*(Continued on page 128)*

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**Ruth C. Lawson** has held Guggenheim, NATO and American Society of International Law fellowships for a book she is now writing on NATO and the problem of European security. She edited *International Regional Organizations: Constitutional Foundations* (New York: Praeger, 1962) and contributes annually to *Collier's Year Book*.

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# BOOK REVIEWS

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## ON THE MIDDLE EAST

**POLITICS IN LEBANON.** EDITED BY LEONARD BINDER. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966. 345 pages, preface, notes and index, \$8.50.)

When writers on the Middle East discuss democracy, there is usually an effort to explain failure. Lebanon is an exception. The Lebanese system is a fragile thing, but somehow there it is. Although based on a confluence of factors not found elsewhere, many characteristics of Lebanese politics are significant for any democracy. Vital is recognition that the system and its institutions, admittedly imperfect, must come ahead of personal ambition. *Politics in Lebanon* shows as much as any book can of what Lebanon is and how it works. Seventeen academic specialists explore the country's internal problems and its foreign relations.

Herbert M. Berk

University of Pennsylvania

**THE FOREIGN POLICY OF IRAN, 1500-1941: A DEVELOPING NATION IN WORLD AFFAIRS.** BY ROUHOLLAH K. RAMAZANI. Foreword by Quincy Wright. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1966. 330 pages, notes and index, \$7.50.)

The stamp of the Shi'ite Safavi dynasty was imposed on Iran in 1500, unifying and setting the country off as a separate Islamic entity and so it has remained. As one of the few non-Western states never colonized by a European power, an account of Iran's independent experience and how it has been maintained is welcome. The author hopes that his study will be useful for other countries in Asia and Africa, some of which are only now beginning to contend with the maze of great and small-power politics.

The book's title is misleading, for the developments of three centuries are dis-

missed in 19 pages; one arrives almost directly at the Constitutional Revolution of 1905. The strength of the study lies in its treatment of the next 36 years, to the abdication of the late Reza Shah. It is unfortunate that Ramazani attempts to explain the characteristics of Iran's foreign policy in terms of hypotheses that seem neither adequately researched nor supported over the 450 years of Iran's history. The effort to limit himself to foreign policy, however, is welcome, as is much of the information on Iran's transitional period under Reza Shah.

H.M.B.

**TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: THE CASE OF IRAN.** BY JAHANGIR AMUZEGAR. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. 275 pages and notes, \$15.00.)

Fifteen years of Point 4 assistance to Iran are analyzed by a scholar who studied and taught economics in the United States and is now finance minister of Iran. The views expressed and questions discussed are not narrowly Iranian, and the book should be seriously considered by anyone interested in a foreign national's conclusions about United States aid. Careful reading is necessary, however, for many points are dropped into an uneven mix of almost limitless citations.

As the author points out, United States technicians too often tried to apply American technique without recognizing different conditions of this very different country. Some, just out of school, with no practical experience, were assigned to "advise" senior Iranian doctors or engineers. Severe congressional criticism of the program was followed by administration that was heavy-handed, stumbling and unrealistic. On the other side of the coin, however, one could probably still wish for greater integrity on the part of the host country and that more

trained Iranians would be willing to soil their hands with labor, and to serve not only in the capital but also in the backward provinces. H.M.B.

**THE ISLAMIC LAW OF NATIONS: SHAYBANI'S SIYAR.** Translated with an introduction, notes, and appendices by Majid Khadduri. Foreword by Philip C. Jessup, Judge, the International Court of Justice. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. 311 pages, glossary, bibliography and index, \$8.00.)

Professor Khadduri is director of the Center for Middle East Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He uses "siyar" to mean a commentary—this one on the relations between Islam and the rest of the world. Shaybani's text, which takes the form of a dialogue, also reveals much about classical Middle Eastern culture. The excellent introductory essay on "Islamic Law and the Law of Nations" opens the subject to any reader concerned with the various problems of universality of law since the emergence of many non-Western states.

H.M.B.

**THE KURDS: AN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL STUDY.** By HASSAN ARFA. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966. 179 pages with maps, photographs, bibliography, glossary and index, \$5.60.)

The Kurds, about whom Hassan Arfa writes, number some seven to nine million people who live in an ill-defined region intersected by the boundaries of Turkey, Iran and Iraq. With tribal units ready-made for military action, and sheltered by rough terrain, the Kurds have periodically fought to keep government at a distance. However, nationalist states have sought primary loyalty and have also become more efficient. There is now little likelihood that lasting autonomy based on separate ethnic allegiance will be tolerated. Although they form the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East, the Kurds are still too few, even if they were not divided among themselves, to win the right to re-

main apart. Numerous uprisings have been put down, although the present Kurdish war in Iraq is unsettled after five years. Settlement of the problem there awaits greater government stability.

General Arfa provides a history of the Kurds in Turkey, Iran and Iraq, but his most valuable contribution is the detail of the campaigns, some of which he led, against Kurdish insurgents in Iran. A loyal Iranian, his life has been dedicated to strengthening the central government. He avoids discussing several short, but violent, Kurdish rebellions in Iran since 1947—rebellions marked by greater disparity between government power and that of the rebels than at the time of his campaigns. Regarding Turkey, the author, who was also ambassador to that country, states that the Turkish government denies the existence of Kurds in its territory. The Turks hedge, however, for Turkish sources list over two million "Kurdish-speaking" inhabitants. H.M.B.

**ARABIA AND THE ISLES.** By HAROLD INGRAMS. (Third edition; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. 400 pages, photographs, maps, notes and index, \$10.00.)

**FAREWELL TO ARABIA.** By DAVID HOLDEN. (New York: Walker, 1966. 268 pages, photographs, maps, notes, bibliography and index, \$5.95.)

With the exception of some items of trade and such anomalies as the portable generator carried by a sultan as he traveled from palace to palace, the Hadhramaut described by Harold Ingrams for the first edition of *Arabia and The Isles* was probably much as it had always been. Yet in the time covered by the experience of this one man, it is possible to chart much of the history of British imperial endeavor there. The story began with Ingrams' assignment as political officer in 1934, and will end with British withdrawal from Aden and South Arabia in 1968. As the author has added a preliminary chapter commenting

(Continued on page 115)

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## CURRENT DOCUMENTS

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### U. N. Censure of Israel

*In the strongest United Nations rebuke to either side in the 15 years of dispute along the 1949 armistice line drawn between the Arab nations and Israel, the United Nations Security Council voted 14 to 0 (with one abstention) to censure Israel for its November 13th raid on Jordan. The full text of the November 25, 1966, resolution follows:*

The Security Council,

Having heard the statements of the representatives of Jordan and Israel concerning the grave Israeli military action which took place in the southern Hebron area on 13 November 1966,

Having noted the information provided by the Secretary General concerning this military action in his statement of 16 November and also document S/7593,

Observing that this incident constituted a large-scale and carefully planned military action on the territory of Jordan by the armed forces in Israel,

Reaffirming the previous resolutions of the Security Council condemning past incidents of reprisal in breach of the general armistice agreement and of the United Nations Charter,

Recalling the repeated resolutions of the Security Council for the cessation of violent incidents across the demarcation line, and not overlooking past incidents of this nature,

Reaffirming the necessity for strict adherence to the general armistice agreement:

1. Deplores the loss of life and heavy damage to property resulting from the action of the Israeli Government of 13 November 1966;

2. Censures Israel for this large-scale military action in violation of the United Nations Charter and of the general armistice agreement between Israel and Jordan;

3. Emphasizes to Israel that actions of military reprisal cannot be tolerated and that, if they are repeated, the Security Council will

*(Continued on page 114)*

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### Secretary Rusk on the Middle East

*On August 25, 1966, before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, Secretary of State Dean Rusk outlined United States defense commitments around the world. The portions of his statement in reference to the Middle East are given below:*

. . .

In addition to United States treaty commitments, both the Congress, through joint resolutions, and the executive branch, through executive agreements and statements by the President, have indicated the United States' interest in the security of a particular area or a particular country. Our interest in the stability of the Near East has been indicated

through such means. In the 1950 tripartite declaration the United States, the United Kingdom, and France expressed their opposition to the use of force or threat of force in that area. Our policy was given further expression by the 1957 joint resolution of Congress to promote peace and stability in the Middle East. There the Congress declared that the "United States regards as vital to



the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East" and that "if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism."

Pursuant to this authorization, our interest in the security of the Near East has been further evidenced by our association, albeit as a nonmember, with the Central Treaty Organization. The United States maintains membership on the Scientific Council and on the Military, Economic, and Counter-Subversion Committees of CENTO, and is an observer on the Ministers Council. In the 1958 declaration respecting the Baghdad Pact the United States expressed its intention to cooperate with the members of the pact for their security and defense and followed that up with identical bilateral agreements of cooperation with Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. These agreements declared that in the event of aggression the United States would take such appropriate action as may be mutually agreed upon.

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## THE NEW EGYPT

*(Continued from page 97)*

under both the first and the second five-year plans, are in full swing in addition to the construction of the high dam; and these other plans include peasant emigration to "the New Valley" linking the southern oases of the western desert.<sup>13</sup> Industrialization has been relatively rapid; education in schools and universities has a priority rating; and a birth control program has recently been offi-

<sup>13</sup> The higher council for family planning was established in October, 1965, "to supervise birth control operations." See *The United Arab Republic 1966, The Year Book*, "Major Events" (October 6, 26, 1965), pp. 270, 271. In the official opinions (*fatwas*) issued by Muslim Egyptian religious leaders, Koranic Law contains no interdiction of birth control in the interest of family welfare.

cially initiated with the cooperation of UNICEF, through the medium of adult education in urban and rural areas. The professional middle class now has a national function, and the peasants and workers have economic security as well as a new status.

The people of Egypt, who have shown themselves resilient and long-suffering over the centuries, will continue to benefit from the agrarian and other reform laws and from the increasing productivity of their country. Moreover, the population is homogeneous and accustomed to living within the framework of sophisticated legal institutions. Egyptians have long accepted the rule of law: the socio-religious Sacred Law of Islam, as well as supplementary civil and commercial laws introduced into Egypt through the impact of the West. The central government of the Revolution and its revolutionary leadership is supported by the affirmative consensus of the large majority of the population. Such a society has predictability and gives promise of continuance in its new way of life.

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## U.N. CENSURE

*(Continued from page 113)*

have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to insure against the repetition of such acts;

4. Requests the Secretary General to keep the situation under review and report to the Security Council as appropriate.

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## CHANGING OF THE GUARD

*(Continued from page 71)*

elsewhere, left little range of choice. In July, 1966, the United States suggested that the British might as well cut their forces east of Suez since they no longer served a useful purpose. To what extent the political vacuum in the western Indian Ocean may be filled remains an open question. As to the changing of the guard, however, there can be no question.

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## IRAQ AND KUWAIT

(Continued from page 89)

progress along the revolutionary socialistic lines followed in neighboring Arab countries. Unlike Iraq, Kuwait does not need to abandon its present constitutional structure, although it cannot possibly remain immune from foreign or regional ideological influences. Like Iraq, it may have to adapt the imported ideas and ideals to the needs and aspirations of its people. But Kuwait has only recently adopted the parliamentary system, and its rulers are not unaware of the significance of their neighbor's experiences with revolutionary methods.

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## ISRAEL

(Continued from page 83)

and return our homeland to us. Time works in favor of the Israelis. At present only Syria has the properly militant attitude. But Syria alone has insufficient strength for the task. We know that we cannot liberate Palestine ourselves but we can bring on the Israeli retaliation that will eventually force Nasser to fight.

With the admitted cooperation of the Syrian government, the terrorists continued their raids. Israeli retaliation was swift and sufficiently severe to cause Jordan and Lebanon, in effect, to opt out of the conflict by making it extremely difficult for the terrorists to continue to use their respective territories. However, by the end of 1966, Syrian-based raids had reached such a force that the government of Prime Minister Eshkol, yielding to the "hawks" of Israeli public opinion, staged a massive reprisal in November against both Jordanian and Syrian forces. By this ill-advised move, Israel came perilously close to falling into the trap the Palestinian terrorists had set. Fortunately for the structure of Middle Eastern peace, Nasser—who, had a similar situation arisen as few as five years before, might well have called for Egyptian mobilization against Israel—was this time conspicuously absent from the scene. He made a great show of prolonging his stay in

New Delhi at the nonaligned powers conference convened by Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Yugoslav President Tito and himself.

Fortunately for Israel, these developments showed that no Arab state with the exception of Syria is willing to commit itself to a third round of the Palestine war. And this demonstration of Arab attitude in 1966 will possibly prove to be the long-hoped-for turning point on the tortured road of Arab-Israeli relations. Against this background, the unanimous censure of Israel by the United Nations Security Council was indeed a small price to pay for such a clear demonstration of the realities of the power politics of the Middle East.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 112)

in detail on political developments through 1966, the book is brought up to date while it retains its timeless qualities.

In *Farewell to Arabia*, a former Middle East correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian* covers the story of change ". . . and the fierce rearguard action against the encroachments of the new world" around the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf since his assignment to the area in 1956. He offers the reader not only superb accounts of his own experiences, but keen political analysis as well. Unlike the retired colonial official who made and carried out policy, David Holden views the British role with detachment. H.M.B.

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## SAUDI ARABIA

(Continued from page 104)

prochement with Washington as a betrayal of the Arab cause. It would be erroneous, however, to think that this resumption of the inter-Arab cold war was a direct result of the above-mentioned policies of King Faisal. Such a resumption was inevitable regardless of the Saudi moves because of the inherent

(Continued on page 128)

## THE SOVIET UNION

*(Continued from page 77)*

time of this writing these countries are definitely listed, together with Egypt and Algeria, in the progressive camp, and Yemen is mentioned occasionally as progressive.

### REFLECTIONS

From this short survey, it becomes clear that practical rather than ideological factors have determined Soviet policies in the Middle East. It must be admitted that the facts of history and Western blunders have made the Soviets' task much easier. Still, the Soviet march in the Middle East seems to have been considerably slowed down, if not halted. For with all their astuteness, Soviet policy-makers could not predict developments in the Arab world. Although to some extent Russia is somewhat closer to the Eastern cultures than the West, like the West it has failed with the Arabs. In their dealings in the Middle East, both the West and the U.S.S.R. have applied measures in terms of their own needs and their own experiences rather than the needs, experiences and patterns of the Arab countries. The inevitable result for both has been failure.

Soviet policy, furthermore, has not been consistent in terms of guiding principles. It has shifted from complete avoidance of national liberation movements and their bourgeois leaders to complete cooperation on the basis of full partnership with the national bourgeoisie, and then back to a policy based on ideological identification. With all the Soviet girations and ideological gymnastics, two features are nonetheless constant. In supporting various types of unity, whether based on "pure" nationalism or on progressivism, the Soviet leaders have never advocated or encouraged the consolidation of the Arab countries into one state or even a strong federation of states. The reason for this may be the realization that this could not be achieved, at least under the present circumstances, for if stability is the crucial issue in the single states, it would become an unmanageable problem in a consolidated state or federation.

But even if consolidation could be achieved, the Soviets would have to oppose it. For in a single unified Arab state, Soviet influence would be nil. Indeed, Soviet success in inter-Arab affairs stems from internal divisions; if these divisions were removed, Arab leaders might completely disregard the Soviets. The Kremlin planners were not happy, to say the least, when the United Arab Republic—merging Syria with Egypt—was established; when the union was subsequently dissolved, Moscow heaved a sigh of relief.

The other constant in Soviet policy is its opposition to open hostilities. In moments of crisis in the Middle East, the Soviet Union has been vociferous in its warnings. To endear themselves to the Arabs, the Soviet leaders have heaped heavy abuse on Israel, yet they have never encouraged an outbreak of open hostilities between Israel and the Arabs.

Nor would they want to see open warfare between one Arab state and another, even between Nasser, the progressive, and Faisal, the reactionary. Continuing conflict in the Yemen has been for the Soviets a very distasteful and disturbing aspect of inter-Arab relations. The Soviet Union, of course, is ready and willing to supply arms to foster tension, but it supplies weapons more for political than actual warfare purposes.

Different reasons prompt this opposition to open war. The Kremlin policy-makers no doubt believe that their ends can be achieved by peaceful means and that there is no need to risk war. To judge from certain achievements in the Middle East—the removal of Western powers and their influence, and Soviet entrenchment in Egypt and other areas—such a belief may be justified. In addition, the policy-makers must be aware that open hostilities, whether between Israel and the Arabs or between one Arab state and another, would always involve the risk of a major conflagration which the Soviet Union is determined to avoid. Local limited wars that can be controlled may sometimes be desirable, chiefly as propaganda tools. But the Middle East is too explosive and the risks are too high.

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# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

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*A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of December, 1966, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

### Arab League

Dec. 8—At an emergency conference beginning yesterday, the chief of the League's unified military command, General Aly Aly Amer, says that the command is too weak to shoulder "its responsibilities" against Israel.

Dec. 11—It is reported that last night the Arab League's defense council unanimously decided that Iraqi and Saudi Arabian troops should enter Jordan within 2 months to repel any Israeli attack. Before Jordan will permit entry of Arab League troops into Jordan, the U.A.R. would have to replace U.N. troops in the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula. No Syrian troops will be admitted to Jordan.

Dec. 12—*The New York Times* reports that U.A.R. officials are indignant because of Jordanian resistance to the Arab League resolution. It is also reported that the Jordanian information minister has termed the resolution on entry of foreign troops into Jordan an agreement "in principle" only.

Dec. 13—In Cairo, sources report that the Arab League boycott against the Coca Cola Company will not be imposed for 9 months. (See *Arab League, Current History*, January, 1967, p. 58.)

### Disarmament

(See *China, U.S.S.R., and U.S., Military*)

### European Economic Community (Common Market)

Dec. 20—At a meeting of economic ministers, the 6 Common Market nations agree on guidelines for budgetary, monetary and wage-price policies in 1967.

### European Free Trade Association (EFTA)

Dec. 30—At midnight, EFTA becomes an "industrial free-trade area," 3 years ahead of schedule. The 7 member nations lift all tariff restrictions on manufactured goods traded among themselves. Only Portugal, because it is less industrially advanced, will have until 1980 to remove many of its tariffs.

### Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA)

Dec. 11—Chilean Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdés leaves a LAFTA conference because it is conducting negotiations on a product-by-product basis rather than working for across-the-board tariff cuts.

### North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Dec. 14—A Paris meeting of the NATO powers (in which France does not participate) decides to establish a 7-nation permanent nuclear planning group; the U.S., Britain, Italy and West Germany will be permanent members and 3 rotating members will be chosen every 18 months. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara attend the meeting. The 7-nation planning group will be under a larger supervisory body composed of all 15 members except Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway and France. Later Rusk confers with French President Charles de Gaulle.

Dec. 15—U.S. Secretary of State Rusk addresses a full council meeting of the foreign and defense ministers from the 15 member states. French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville declares that France

will remain within the NATO alliance although she has withdrawn from its unified military command.

Dec. 16—The council of ministers issues a communiqué agreeing to promote better relations with East Europe and the U.S.-S.R. In a separate declaration by France, West Germany, Britain and the U.S. (and endorsed by all members), it is noted that West Germany will seek to develop closer contacts with East Germany.

Dec. 21—West Germany and France exchange letters formalizing an agreement under which 62,000 French troops will remain stationed in West Germany despite French withdrawal from the unified NATO defense command.

## United Nations

Dec. 2—Following a Security Council recommendation, the General Assembly unanimously reelects U Thant secretary-general.

Dec. 8—British Foreign Secretary George Brown asks the U.N. Security Council to impose mandatory sanctions on 12 exports from Rhodesia.

Dec. 9—The Zambian foreign minister, Simon M. Kapwepwe, condemns British proposals for sanctions against Rhodesia. He asks for an embargo on oil shipments and sanctions on all exports and imports. (South Africa has been the principal exporter of oil and lubricants to Rhodesia.) He urges that all branches of British banks in Rhodesia be closed.

The General Assembly votes to admit Barbados as the 122d member of the U.N.

Dec. 12—Chief U.S. Representative Arthur J. Goldberg tells the Security Council that the U.S. supports Britain's selected list of mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia.

Dec. 14—The Soviet Union's delegate, Nikolai T. Fedorenko, demands that all oil shipments to Rhodesia be stopped.

Dec. 16—The Security Council votes, 11-0 (4 abstentions), to approve a resolution imposing mandatory sanctions on 12 Rhodesian exports and placing an embargo on oil and arms shipments to Rhodesia by U.N. members.

The General Assembly approves 2 covenants on human rights: one covers political and civil rights, the other economic, social and cultural rights. They are legally binding on the signatory states and will come into force after 35 nations ratify them.

Dec. 19—In a letter from U.S. delegate Arthur Goldberg, U Thant is asked to take "whatever steps . . . [are] necessary to bring about the necessary discussions which could lead to a cease-fire" in the Vietnamese war. (See also *War in Vietnam*.)

The General Assembly approves the treaty on the peaceful uses of outer space, prohibiting nations from placing weapons of mass destruction into orbit around the earth or installing such weapons on the moon or other celestial bodies. It also outlaws national claims to sovereignty over any celestial body. The treaty will become effective when ratified by 5 governments, including the U.S., Britain and the U.S.S.R.

Dec. 20—General Assembly President Abdul Rahman Pazhwak appeals to the U.S., North Vietnam, South Vietnam and the National Liberation Front (Vietcong) to agree unconditionally to discuss a settlement of the Vietnamese war.

The General Assembly closes its 21st session.

## War in Vietnam

(See also *Intl, U.N.; China; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Dec. 2—As skies clear, U.S. navy and air force jets bomb 2 target areas near Hanoi.

Dec. 11—U.S. "military sources" in Washington, D.C., report that on November 11, 2 Seventh Fleet destroyers were authorized to interdict coastal shipping in North Vietnam between the 17th parallel (the North Vietnamese border) and the 18th parallel, a stretch of 78 miles.

Dec. 13—*Tass* (Soviet press agency) charges that U.S. planes on bombing raids today have attacked residential areas in Hanoi, for the first time. North Vietnam's official press agency declares that a protest has



- been filed with the International Control Commission.
- Dec. 15—It is officially announced that the level of U.S. armed forces in Vietnam reached 368,000 last week.
- Dec. 16—A special announcement from the headquarters of General William C. Westmoreland, U.S. commander in Vietnam, states that during the raids of December 13–14, all bombs fell “in the military target areas,” i.e., the Vandien depot 5 miles south of Hanoi and the Yenvien yards 6 miles northeast of Hanoi.
- Dec. 19—The National Liberation Front (political arm of the Vietcong) broadcasts a message on the eve of the Front’s sixth anniversary, asserting that the only solution in Vietnam “is for the Americans to go home and to recognize the Liberation Front as the only representative of South Vietnam’s population.”
- Dec. 22—U.S. military spokesmen announce that since the first U.S. soldier died in Vietnam 5 years ago today, 6,407 U.S. servicemen have been killed in action in Vietnam.
- Dec. 23—It is reported that on December 1, U.S. troops, for the first time, were assigned to assist South Vietnamese forces defending Giadin Province, which surrounds the Saigon capital district. The assignment was given to protect the airport and the outskirts of Saigon from terrorist attacks.
- Dec. 24—A 48-hour Christmas cease-fire begins at 7:00 A.M.
- Harrison E. Salisbury, assistant managing editor of *The New York Times*, reports from Hanoi that the U.S. bombing raids of December 13–14 most likely “could [not] be carried out without civilian damage and casualties.”
- Dec. 26—The 48-hour truce, marred by over 60 shooting incidents, ends at 7:00 A.M.
- The U.S. Defense Department issues a statement that, during bombing attacks, “it is impossible to avoid all damage to civilian areas. . . .” However, it adds, “all possible care is taken to avoid civilian casualties.” The Defense Department admits that civilian areas had been hit accidentally during U.S. raids on military targets at

Namdin and Phuly. In a story released today, Harrison Salisbury reports heavy damage to “purely civilian targets” in the cities of Namdin and Phuly.

- Dec. 30—British Foreign Secretary George Brown sends messages to the U.S., South Vietnam and North Vietnam, inviting them to meet “in any suitable British territory” to negotiate a Vietnamese settlement.
- Dec. 31—At 7:00 A.M. a 48-hour New Year’s truce begins.

In a letter to U.S. Representative Arthur Goldberg, made public today, it is disclosed that U Thant has asked the U.S. to discontinue the bombing of North Vietnam “even without conditions” and take the first step toward peace. Goldberg replies that peace “cannot be attained by . . . the exercise of restraint by only one side in the Vietnam conflict.”

## ARGENTINA

- Dec. 6—The Argentine government discloses that Lieutenant General Pascual A. Pistarini, who led the June, 1966, revolt that ousted President Arturo U. Illia, has retired unexpectedly, as the result of differences with President Juan Carlos Onganía.
- Dec. 29—The executive cabinet of President Juan Carlos Onganía unexpectedly resigns.
- Dec. 30—A new 4-man cabinet is organized, reportedly of a more liberal cast.

## BURUNDI

- Dec. 6—President Michel Micombero, the colonel who overthrew King Ntare V last month, names his cabinet.

## CHINA, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF

- Dec. 16—*Hsinhua* (Communist Chinese press agency) declares that 4 U.S. planes “dive-bombed” China’s embassy in Hanoi on December 14, “causing serious damage to its premises.”
- Dec. 23—It is reported that the former army chief-of-staff, Lo Jui-ching, was arrested earlier this week. Lo is associated with President Liu Shao-chi and Secretary General of the Communist Party Teng Hsiao-

ping, both of whom have come under attack recently.

Dec. 27—Japanese reports from Peking disclose that 100,000 Red Guards, at a Peking rally today, called President Liu "the Khrushchev of China" and "boss of capitalism."

Dec. 28—*Hung Chi* (a Red Guard newspaper) reports that Red Guards have arrested the former defense minister, Peng Teh-huai.

*Hsinhua* announces that today China successfully conducted its fifth nuclear test.

Dec. 30—The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, in an announcement, indicates that the Chinese atomic bomb tested earlier this week was apparently a triple-stage, "dirty" bomb, the most powerful kind of atomic weapon and capable of producing considerable radioactive debris.

### CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Kinshasa)

Dec. 23—The Congolese government announces that it has established a new company to replace the Belgian-owned Union Minière du Haut-Katanga. Mineral exports from Katanga are halted. A law passed earlier this year by the Congolese parliament ordered all foreign companies operating in the Congo to move their headquarters to the Congo. Recently President Joseph Mobutu warned the Union that it would lose its mining concessions unless it transferred its headquarters from Brussels to Kinshasa.

### CUBA

Dec. 28—It is announced that 200 persons (American citizens, their families and close dependents) have been allowed to leave Cuba for the U.S. U.S. State Department officials praise the Mexican government whose good offices were instrumental in working out the arrangements to permit the evacuation of an eventual 2,000 persons.

### FRANCE

(See also *Intl*, *NATO*)

Dec. 2—Visiting Soviet Premier A. N. Kosygin, at a luncheon at the Paris city hall, warns that fascism is again gaining strength in Germany and that Germany must not possess nuclear weapons "in any form whatsoever." (See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Dec. 9—Kosygin flies home. A communiqué signed yesterday and released today hails French-Soviet cooperation.

Dec. 20—The Federation of the Democratic-Socialist Left (a leftist coalition of the Socialist Party, Radical Party and several small political "clubs") and the Communist Party agree to work together to fight Gaullism in the Spring, 1967, parliamentary election.

### GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Dec. 1—The Social Democratic parliamentary group approves the coalition government of the Christian Democratic Union and Social Democrats led by Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger. West Berlin's mayor, Willy Brandt, will be vice chancellor and foreign minister. Franz Josef Strauss (leader of the Christian Social Union, C.D.U.'s Bavarian branch) is named minister of finance.

Dec. 13—In an hour-long policy address to the *Bundestag*, Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger urges "... a close and trusting relationship between Germany and France"; improved relations with Britain, East Germany, East Europe and the U.S.S.R. are advocated.

Dec. 18—Kiesinger, in a taped telecast released in the U.S. today, declares that West Germany can try "to remove some of the difficulties existing today between France and the United States." (See also *France*.)

Dec. 19—An autobahn bridge between East and West Germany is opened, restoring the direct Berlin-Munich route for the first time since World War II.

### GREECE

Dec. 20—It is announced that the National Radical Union has withdrawn its support from Premier Stephanos Stephanopoulos'

coalition cabinet. The N.R.U. has held 99 of the coalition government's 154 votes.

Dec. 21—King Constantine accepts the resignation of Stephanopoulos; he asks Professor Ioannis Paraskevopoulos, governor of the National Bank, to form a nonpolitical cabinet.

Dec. 22—The new cabinet under Premier Ioannis Paraskevopoulos is sworn in.

## INDIA

Dec. 3—Indian sources report that the U.S.S.R. and India have signed a protocol to increase their trade.

Dec. 6—At a convention, dissident members of the ruling Congress Party agree to establish a new opposition party, the People's Congress.

Dec. 10—The Soviet Union grants a new credit of \$330 million to India.

Dec. 22—The Soviet Union informs Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that it will make available immediately 200,000 tons of wheat valued at \$13 million. The wheat will be a gift.

The U.S. announces an emergency grant of 900,000 tons of wheat and grain sorghum, worth \$53 million.

Dec. 26—The Indian government and Sant Fateh Singh (a Sikh religious-political leader) negotiate a settlement of Sikh demands and avert the immolation of 8 Sikh leaders. The Indian government agrees to "arbitrate" the Sikh demand that Chandigarh, joint capital of Punjab and Haryana states, be completely controlled by Punjab (a Sikh-dominated state).

## INDONESIA

Dec. 7—The Indonesian government announces that it will not hold a plebiscite in 1969 in West Irian to see if the people wish to remain under Indonesia's rule. The plebiscite was a condition agreed upon when the Netherlands transferred West Irian to Indonesian control.

## JAPAN

Dec. 2—The cabinet resigns as requested by

Premier Eisaku Sato, who wishes to reorganize his government.

Dec. 13—Sato names a new 19-man cabinet.

## JORDAN

(See also *Intl, Arab League*)

Dec. 1—The Amman radio broadcasts a report charging that "saboteurs coming from Syria" by order of the Syrian government have infiltrated "to blow up Jordanian government buildings, bridges and military telephone lines."

Dec. 22—The U.S. State Department announces that the U.S. is giving military aid to strengthen Jordan's "defensive capability."

Premier Wasfi el-Tall resigns. King Hussein asks him to form a new government; he has dissolved the chamber of deputies. Subsequently, Premier Tall announces his new caretaker cabinet and calls for national elections.

Dec. 29—An Amman radio broadcast charges that a Syrian patrol crossed 450 feet inside Jordan, killing Sergeant Feisal Murad, a security officer, at his home.

## LEBANON

Dec. 2—Premier Abdullah Kaffi resigns. President Charles Helou asks him to remain in office until a new cabinet is formed.

Dec. 3—President Helou asks Rashed Karami, a four-time ex-premier, to form a new government.

Dec. 7—Premier Karami announces that he has formed a cabinet.

## LESOTHO

Dec. 28—It is reported that King Moshoe-shoe II has been placed under "protective custody" at his residence under an emergency powers act. In clashes between the king's men and police yesterday, 8 persons were killed. Moshoeshoe has defied the constitutional government and demanded more power for himself.

## PAKISTAN

Dec. 23—The U.S. announces it will send

500,000 tons of grain to Pakistan, to provide food until the April, 1967, harvest.

## POLAND

Dec. 27—*Trybuna Ludu* (organ of the central committee of the United Workers [Communist] Party) publishes a statement in which the government's right to review the education of future priests is upheld. The failure of the Roman Catholic Church to comply with state laws has led to demands for the removal of the rectors of 6 seminaries and the closing of 4 seminaries.

## PORTUGAL

### Macao

Dec. 3—Communist Chinese riot in Macao, the third outburst in 4 days. Macao is a Portuguese enclave on China's south coast.

Dec. 4—Portuguese troops open fire on leftist Chinese rioters as demonstrations continue. The governor of Macao, Brigadier Nobre de Carvalho, declares that the demands of the Chinese community will be met.

Dec. 13—The Macao radio announces that Portuguese officials will accede to demands by the foreign affairs bureau of Kwangtung Province in Red China. It is reported that Chinese troops had been concentrated around Macao to pressure Portuguese authorities.

Dec. 17—The colonial government in Macao accedes to Communist Chinese demands and dismisses 2 Portuguese officials.

## RHODESIA

Dec. 1—British Prime Minister Harold Wilson flies to Gibraltar. He is to be joined by Prime Minister Ian Smith of Rhodesia.

Dec. 2—Aboard the British cruiser, *Tiger*, Wilson and Smith confer.

Dec. 4—Wilson and Smith end their conference.

The British government announces that the British Cabinet has approved the draft of a settlement worked out by Wilson and Smith to restore "constitutional rule" in Rhodesia.

Dec. 5—Prime Minister Smith tells a Salisbury crowd why the Rhodesian cabinet has

rejected Britain's proposals for restoring constitutional government in Rhodesia. Smith states that he could not accept an interim restoration of British rule while a new constitution was being worked out. He observes that "the Rhodesian government would be extremely foolish were they to abandon the substance of their present constitution for the shadow of a mythical constitution yet to be evolved." (See also *Intl, U.N.*)

## SPAIN

Dec. 15—The government announces that in yesterday's referendum the new constitution proposed by Generalissimo Francisco Franco was approved by a large majority.

## SYRIA

See also *Intl, Arab League*)

Dec. 7—Dr. Nureddin Attassi, Syrian chief-of-state, addresses a Damascus rally. He appeals to Jordanians and Palestine Arabs to overthrow King Hussein, "the traitor king." He offers them arms.

Dec. 8—The Syrian cabinet issues a decree impounding the assets of the Iraq Petroleum Company because of Syria's claim to back royalties and to higher pipeline transit fees.

Dec. 12—Industry Minister Assad Takla shuts off the oil pipeline owned by the Iraq Petroleum Company. The company has rejected Syria's demand for doubling transit fees on the pipeline and on exports at the terminal.

## THAILAND

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

## TURKEY

Dec. 20—Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin arrives in Turkey; he is welcomed by Premier Suleyman Demirel.

Dec. 21—It is rumored that Kosygin has told Demirel that the Soviet Union regrets the recent sale of arms to the Greek Cypriote government of President Makarios by Czechoslovakia but that the Soviet Union is not responsible.

## U.S.S.R., THE

(See also *India* and *Turkey*)

Dec. 1—Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin arrives in Paris to meet with French President Charles de Gaulle. (See also *France*.)

Dec. 3—During his state visit to France, Kosygin declares that any Soviet Jews wishing to be reunited with their families in the West will be permitted to do so.

Dec. 4—*Pravda* (Communist Party newspaper) publishes a statement appealing for peace in the Middle East.

Dec. 9—*The New York Times* reports that the Soviet Union has relaxed its emigration policy; Soviet citizens may seek exit visas. "The total emigration is still small, but sharp percentage increases . . . have given encouragement to many people. . . ." In 1966, over 700 Soviet citizens were permitted to join their families in the U.S.; half of this group will remain permanently in the U.S.

Dec. 13—It is reported that *Jane's Fighting Ships*, in its review for 1966–1967, lists the Soviet Union as the second most powerful naval power.

The central committee of the Communist Party ends a 2-day meeting; it supports Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev's proposal for a world Communist conference.

Dec. 14—*Tass* (Soviet press agency) announces that a series of rocket test shots that began in the Pacific November 19 has been completed two weeks ahead of schedule.

Dec. 15—In a report to the Supreme Soviet at the opening of a 3-day meeting, Finance Minister Vasily F. Garbuzov declares that military spending in 1967 will jump 8.2 per cent over 1966's 13.4 billion rubles (\$14.8 billion).

Dec. 18—The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission reports that it has recorded seismic signals indicating that the Soviet Union has conducted an underground nuclear test.

On the eve of his 60th birthday, General Secretary of the Communist Party

Leonid I. Brezhnev receives the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Dec. 21—A Leningrad court sentences a visiting American, Buel Ray Wortham, to 3 years in a labor camp. Wortham exchanged U.S. dollars for rubles on the black market and stole a statue of a bear from a Leningrad hotel.

Dec. 24—*Tass* announces that Luna 13 (an automatic research station) launched December 21 has made a soft landing on the moon.

Dec. 26—*Tass* reports that Luna 13 has attempted to drive a rod into the moon to determine the hardness of its surface.

Dec. 27—The minister of agriculture, Vladimir V. Matskevich, reports that the 1966 grain harvest reached a record 171 million metric tons.

Dec. 30—*Tass* announces that Luna 13 has found that the moon's surface at a depth of 8 to 12 inches is similar to medium density soil on earth.

## UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Dec. 18—It is reported by informed sources that the Soviet Union has agreed to ship wheat to the U.A.R. The U.S. has not renewed a wheat agreement with Egypt, because of a prohibition against giving aid to nations trading with North Vietnam.

## UNITED KINGDOM

### Great Britain

(See *Intl, U.N., Rhodesia and U.S., Foreign Policy*)

## UNITED STATES, THE

### Agriculture

Dec. 16—After meeting with leaders of the Florida citrus industry, Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman announces that the government will purchase "substantial" amounts of surplus frozen Florida orange juice.

Dec. 20—The Department of Agriculture announces that an excellent crop for all commodities was harvested in 1966; it tied that of 1963 and lagged behind that of 1965 by only 3 per cent.



## Civil Rights

Dec. 2—Martin Luther King, Jr., announces that the Chicago Freedom Movement (the united civil rights front in Chicago) will lead a Negro voter registration drive in that city.

It is disclosed that the Public Health Service has notified 17 hospitals of violations of the civil rights requirements of the medicare program. They are given a chance to appear at a hearing to review their cases before they are ruled ineligible to receive federal funds.

Dec. 5—It is announced that federal aid has been withdrawn from 6 school districts and 1 college in the South because they failed to comply with the nondiscrimination requirements of the civil rights act of 1964.

Dec. 8—At a hearing of a Senate subcommittee studying urban problems, the head of the Congress of Racial Equality, Floyd B. McKissick, testifies. Senator Robert Kennedy (D., New York) criticizes the black power slogan.

Dec. 9—Some 700 students at Tuskegee Institute riot to protest the acquittal yesterday of a white man accused of slaying fellow-student Samuel Yonge on January 3, 1966.

Dec. 12—A 3-judge federal court in Montgomery, Alabama, declares that an Alabama statute requiring segregated prisons and jails is unconstitutional.

Dec. 17—The Office of Economic Opportunity awards a new grant of \$8 million for 12 months to the Child Development Group of Mississippi, whose Project Head Start funds were suspended on October 2.

Dec. 29—In New Orleans, Louisiana, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in deciding 7 segregation cases in school districts in Louisiana and Alabama, rules that all grades including kindergarten should be desegregated by the fall of 1967. The court supports the desegregation guidelines laid down by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

## Economy

Dec. 2—The Department of Labor reports

that in November the unemployment rate fell to 3.7 per cent.

Dec. 6—President Johnson announces that \$500 million will be released by the home loan bank system to savings and loan associations to expand mortgage activities.

Dec. 9—The Labor Department's monthly wholesale price index reveals that wholesale prices of foods dropped in November. The Census Bureau discloses that in November retail sales fell. The reduction is interpreted to mean that inflationary trends in the economy may be held back without a tax increase.

Dec. 13—The government announces new, slightly revised voluntary guidelines to curb foreign investment and lending by U.S. companies to stem the flow of dollars and offset the balance-of-payments deficit. Secretary of Commerce John T. Connor sends letters to 700 business corporations describing the 1967 guidelines.

Dec. 14—The Federal Reserve Board reports that industrial production dropped in November, 1966, with the automobile and the steel and iron industries accounting for a large share of the decline.

Dec. 15—A Labor Department study discloses that between 1967 and 1970, the U.S. economy can grow no faster than 4 per cent a year. In 1964, 1965 and 1966, the growth rate was 5.5 per cent.

Dec. 27—The Federal Reserve Board issues an announcement to member banks notifying them that the restrictive practices to limit business loans initiated September 1, 1966, have been "terminated" because "credit conditions have changed."

## Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl*, *NATO*, *U.N.*, *War in Vietnam*; *Jordan*; *U.A.R.*)

Dec. 2—Official sources report that since the 1950's, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has wired the Dominican Republic's embassy in Washington so that it might eavesdrop when necessary to U.S. national security.

Dec. 3—President Lyndon Johnson walks across a frontier bridge from Texas into

Mexico, where he is welcomed by Mexican President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz. The 2 leaders attend a celebration at Ciudad Acuña in honor of the joint construction of a dam across the Rio Grande.

Dec. 7—A U.S. State Department spokesman discloses that U.S. helicopters are carrying Thai troops to fight against the Communist-led guerrillas of the Thai Patriotic Front in northeast Thailand.

Dec. 9—U.S. State Department sources report that Britain will postpone any reduction in the Army of the Rhine stationed in West Germany for 6 months; to help finance the cost, the U.S. will purchase \$35 million worth of military equipment from Britain.

State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey admits that a U.S. offer to exchange prisoners of war with North Vietnam and the Vietcong has been rejected. McCloskey repeats the exchange offer.

U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk arrives in South Vietnam and meets with South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Tran Van Do.

Dec. 11—Rusk stops in Thailand to confer on the situation in Southeast Asia.

Dec. 12—U.S. Secretary of State Rusk, during a fueling stopover in New Delhi, confers with Indian Foreign Minister M. C. Chagla for 30 minutes. (See also *India*.)

Dec. 13—Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana), Senate majority leader, urges that the holiday cease-fire run from Christmas through the Vietnamese New Year in early February and that troop reinforcements be barred during that period.

Dec. 15—At the White House, Ford Foundation President McGeorge Bundy meets with President Johnson and his assistants, Walt W. Rostow and Francis Bator, to discuss the possibility of establishing an international forum where advanced societies could share their managerial knowledge. Bundy will visit the U.S.S.R., East Europe, West Europe, Japan and other areas to discuss the project.

Dec. 16—The White House announces that David E. Lilienthal, former chief of the

Atomic Energy Commission, will head a nongovernmental group of economic specialists to assist South Vietnam in planning a postwar economic development program.

In Washington, U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge briefs President Johnson on the Vietnamese war.

Dec. 17—Returning to Washington, D.C., from a global trip, Secretary of State Dean Rusk declares that other nations will send aid to Vietnam.

Dec. 19—U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Freeman, after conferring with President Johnson, declares that the U.S. expects other nations to help India by contributing either grain or money.

Dec. 21—At a news conference, Secretary Rusk expresses the hope that the U.S. and the Soviet Union will not deploy anti-missile defense systems. (See also *U.S., Military*.)

Dec. 30—*The New York Times* publishes the text of an open letter sent yesterday to President Johnson from some 100 college leaders—student body presidents or campus editors. The letter expresses doubts over “American objectives in Vietnam” and asks the President for clarification of our “national purpose.”

U.S. Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach informs the Yugoslav government that the Food for Peace program has been suspended. A congressional prohibition forbids the sale of surplus foods to nations selling or supplying materials to North Vietnam.

Dec. 31—At a news conference, Johnson announces that the U.S. is willing “to do more than our part in meeting Hanoi halfway in any possible cease-fire, truce or peace-conference negotiations.”

## Government

Dec. 2—The Securities and Exchange Commission, in a special report to Congress today, discloses that mutual funds investment companies charge their customers “excessive fees.”

Dec. 10—*The New York Times* discloses that, in a letter to Representative H. R. Gross

(R., Iowa), Federal Bureau of Investigation Director J. Edgar Hoover declared that U.S. Senator Robert Kennedy (D., New York), while U.S. attorney general, was "briefed frequently by an F.B.I. official" concerning eavesdropping activities.

Dec. 11—Senator Kennedy issues a statement denying knowledge of the F.B.I.'s "eavesdropping practices" while attorney general.

Dec. 12—Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare John W. Gardner addresses the opening of a 3-day National Conference on Air Pollution; he asserts "that we are actually losing ground in the fight against air pollution. . . ."

Dec. 15—White House Press Secretary Bill D. Moyers announces that he will resign on January 31 to become publisher of *Newsday* (a Long Island, New York, newspaper). George C. Christian, a member of the White House staff, will become press secretary.

A report by the Consumer Advisory Council presented to President Johnson in June is released today; the report finds that the American consumer very often does not receive his money's worth because of "confusion and ignorance, some deception and even fraud."

Dec. 16—President Johnson visits ex-president Dwight D. Eisenhower, recuperating from removal of his gall bladder at Walter Reed Army Medical Center.

It is announced that the Atomic Energy Commission will build a 200-billion-electron-volt accelerator in Weston, Illinois.

Dec. 19—The General Motors Company recalls over 16,000 new Pontiac cars because of a defect that might cause the steering columns to snap in two.

Dec. 31—The Federal Aviation Administrator, General William F. McKee, announces that the Boeing Company has been chosen to design the U.S. supersonic airliner and the General Electric Company will build the plane's turbojet engine.

## Labor

Dec. 5—Walter P. Reuther, president of the

United Automobile Workers union, announces that his union's executive board has decided to pursue "a more independent course of action" from A.F.L.-C.I.O. policy.

Dec. 9—The U.A.W., faced with suspension from the A.F.L.-C.I.O. because of a 3-months' overdue dues bill, pays one month's arrears.

Dec. 19—President Johnson invokes the Taft-Hartley Act to send 2,100 striking workers at a Union Carbide plant in Kokomo, Indiana, back to work because they are engaged in production essential to the Vietnamese war effort.

Dec. 23—The United Steelworkers of America orders striking workers at the Union Carbide plant in Kokomo back to work after a U.S. court of appeals upholds the use of the Taft-Hartley Act.

Dec. 29—In a letter to the leaders of 1,500 locals, U.A.W. President Walter Reuther and other top union officials charge that the A.F.L.-C.I.O. "suffers from a sense of complacency . . . and is not fulfilling the basic aims and purposes which promoted the merger of the A.F.L. and the C.I.O."

## Military

Dec. 6—President Johnson confers with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Deputy Defense Secretary Cyrus Vance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and special assistant to the president Walt W. Rostow on the military budget. Johnson reveals that he may ask Congress for an additional \$9-\$10 billion to finance the war in Vietnam in the current (1967) fiscal year.

Dec. 15—McNamara announces that he has ordered the army to increase the number of pilots trained each month from 410 to 610.

Dec. 20—At the bottom of a 4,040-foot shaft drilled into Pahute Mesa, Nevada, the Atomic Energy Commission detonates a thermonuclear device of intermediate yield. It is "one of the largest" underground tests ever conducted by the U.S. The U.S. is reportedly working on a nuclear warhead for an antimissile missile.

## Politics

- Dec. 2—New York City Mayor John V. Lindsay declares that President Johnson's budget cuts, mostly in transportation, housing, education and poverty programs, mean "shortchanging the cities of America."
- Dec. 9—Michigan Governor George Romney, arriving at the Republican Governors Association meeting in Colorado Springs, declares that he is interested in what people think about him as the Republican presidential nominee in 1968.
- Dec. 10—Governor-elect of California, Ronald Reagan, at the Colorado Springs meeting, declares he will support the Republican presidential nominee in 1968; for the next 4 years, Reagan asserts, he will work for the state of California.
- Dec. 11—During a television program, U.S. Senator Jacob K. Javits (R., New York) declares that he is "entitled to a national position" after 20 years as ideologist for the Republican Party.
- Dec. 12—Senator Robert Kennedy defends President Johnson against criticism that he is no friend of the poor; Kennedy terms Johnson "a man of great compassion."
- Dec. 16—At the National Governors Conference in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, a resolution is approved calling for the federal government to share its tax revenues with the states.
- Governor Harold E. Hughes of Iowa, chairman of the Democratic governors' caucus, announces that President Johnson will meet with a delegation of Democratic governors to hear their grievances. At a 3-hour caucus of Democratic governors last night in White Sulphur Springs, President Johnson was criticized.
- Dec. 17—The National Governors Conference agrees to establish an office in Washington, D.C., to keep all 50 state governors informed of federal programs.
- Dec. 19—Colorado Governor John A. Love, new chairman of the Republican Governors Association, announces that the Republican National Committee will donate over \$100,000 to set up a national office for

the Republican governors in Washington.

Dec. 21—At the LBJ ranch, 9 Democratic governors consult with President Johnson over their differences with the federal government.

## Press

- Dec. 21—In response to a suit filed by Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy, Cowles Communications, Inc., publisher of *Look* magazine, agrees to delete from its forthcoming serialization of *The Death of a President* by William Manchester certain passages objected to by Mrs. Kennedy. The suit against the publisher of the book, Harper and Row, and William Manchester is still pending. Senator Robert Kennedy (Mrs. Kennedy's brother-in-law) has signed a contract with Manchester authorizing him to write an account of John F. Kennedy's assassination.

## Supreme Court

- Dec. 5—The Supreme Court unanimously rules that Julian Bond, a Negro elected to the Georgia House of Representatives, had been denied his constitutional rights when he was not allowed to take his seat. (See *U.S., Civil Rights, Current History*, March, 1966, p. 188.)
- Dec. 12—The Supreme Court upholds the conviction of James R. Hoffa, president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, for jury tampering, and the imposition of an 8-year sentence.
- The Supreme Court, 5-4, upholds the constitutionality of the Georgia constitution stipulating that the state legislature choose the governor from the 2 leading candidates if none received a majority of the vote.

## THE VATICAN

- Dec. 8—Pope Paul VI urges that parties engaged in the Vietnam conflict extend their holiday truce into an armistice to be followed by peace negotiations.
- Dec. 22—The Pope, in a Christmas message, hopes that a "miracle of good will is still possible" to restore peace in Vietnam.

## VENEZUELA

Dec. 13—President Raul Leoni suspends constitutional guarantees in an effort to fight terrorism. Earlier in the day, the army chief-of-staff was ambushed and wounded and a lawyer in the defense ministry was machine-gunned to death.

Dec. 14—Army troops occupy Central University in Caracas. An arsenal of weapons in a university dormitory is seized.

## VIETNAM, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl. War in Vietnam*)

Dec. 4—Reliable sources report that Premier Nguyen Cao Ky will name Bui Diem, special assistant to Ky, as ambassador to the U.S.

Dec. 8—"A prominent American official," as reported by *The New York Times*, discloses that only half of the civilian pacification teams in Vietnam are effective.

Dec. 27—Deputy U.S. Ambassador William J. Porter authorizes the use of U.S. troops to unload military cargo when 2,500 South Vietnamese longshoremen strike for the second day.

Dr. Phan Quang Dan, a member of the constituent assembly and an outspoken critic of the government, is injured when his car is blown up.

Dec. 30—Striking dock workers agree to end their 5-day strike.

## YUGOSLAVIA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Dec. 4—President Tito returns to Yugoslavia from an unofficial visit to Rumania, where he conferred with Rumanian Communist Party leader Nicolae Ceausescu.

Dec. 14—The U.A.R., India and Yugoslavia, at the end of a 3-day meeting of economic ministers, agree on a trade accord encompassing preferential tariffs, joint shipping service for trade, and special payment facilities.

Dec. 30—It is reported that the former vice-president and writer, Milovan Djilas, will be released from prison after serving more than half of his sentence for challenging the government.

## TURKEY

(Continued from page 110)

It is too soon to know whether or not it is significant that the new Turkish government has expressed its attitude towards the Cyprus issue in a lower key. Turkey's position remains that only a federal state on the island can guarantee both minority and majority interests.

On balance, it appears that the shift in Turkish foreign policy away from the West discernible prior to the 1965 election continues, though Turkey's look to the north may be more cautious. Turkish practices seem to be in tune with growing polycentric tendencies in all regional security organizations. We appear to have entered on a new phase in the Western alliance systems—a phase characterized by the growing restiveness of regional partners—with the result that the United States can no longer take their collaboration for granted.

## SAUDI ARABIA

(Continued from page 115)

dichotomy between the revolutionary and the conservative camps in the Arab world. Nasser and his spiritual allies in Syria and other revolutionary centers represent a new radical philosophy of society and government which is unacceptable to the gradualist evolutionary approach of Faisal.

The Saudi monarchy may be inclined to compromise on certain pressing issues of foreign policy, but it must protect its sovereign status and enhance its capacity of defense, if it is to survive and carry out its program of reform. To judge by public reactions in Saudi Arabia, King Faisal appears to be justified in his conviction that he can count on the endorsement of his policies by both the ruling elite and the broader masses of people in his kingdom.

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